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2. A Minsky bubble? Economic growth and the financial sector 
in 1763-72  
The next two chapters will try to determine in what ways, if any, the 1772-3 crisis 
can be attributed to the growth of instability in the financial system in the decade 
following the signing of the Peace of Paris,1 in 1763. Our points of departure for this 
discussion will be the two competing claims in the literature for the causes of this 
crisis: that the period preceding it can be characterised as a Minsky bubble (rational 
or irrational); alternatively, that the system was made unstable through intervention 
by the authorities (both by the legislature and the BOE).2 More specifically, we will 
attempt to answer a series of interconnected questions: 
1. Did the end of the Seven Years War provide a clearly observable economic 
displacement? Did the contemporaneous Continental crisis in 1763 have any 
effect? Ultimately, was the period 1763-72 an economic "boom"?  
2. Was finance directly connected and even responsible for these events, either 
by facilitating any boom or bubble, or simply by providing the mechanisms 
through which a crash could propagate?  
3. Was asset speculation and monetary expansion as prevalent and excessive as 
claimed in the traditional account? Was the Ayr Bank project frivolous, 
mismanaged, or corrupt ?  
4. Was the Government’s involvement in EIC affairs and its passage of the 1765 
Act on Scottish banking practices the real causes of the 1772 crash, thus 
                                                     
1
 Kindleberger, Manias, p. 123. 
2
 The term “authorities” is used in a broad sense for the BOE which remained a private monopoly 
company all through the period. 
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supporting the claims of those who deny any inherent instability in the 
financial system? 
In the course of answering these questions we will include a basic overview of British 
finance in the 1760s and its role in the structure of the colonial trades with North 
America; the monetary and legal framework under which finance operated, with a 
particular emphasis on banking, stock speculation, paper money, and the role of bills 
of exchange in the money markets; and finally an overview of the salient political 
controversies, particularly that of the EIC.  
In search of an economic displacement 
This section has no pretensions to being a thorough overview of the state and 
dynamic of the British economy in the 1760s and 1770s. That would be needlessly 
diversionary for this discussion, not to mention perforce shallow and incomplete. 
Academic literature on economic growth in the Eighteenth Century is substantial and 
longstanding, but has generally treated these two decades in terms of the wider 
debate on British industrialisation. Though some sporadic claims specific to 1763-72 
have been made, notably by Hoppit, Hamilton, Price, and Sheridan, emphasis has 
rather been on long term trends over a period of many decades and reaching well 
into the nineteenth century, the methodology of measuring economic growth, the 
precise timing of its acceleration during the Industrial Revolution, and even the 
question of whether economic acceleration (or indeed an Industrial Revolution) 
happened in the first place. We are rather more interested in assessing changes in 
economic growth rates for the shorter timescales of the two decades preceding the 
1772 crisis. For this we must return to the same annual time series data that has 
been used in this literature and try to extract any information that might be lost in 
these studies of long run growth. The time series mainly comprise Customs and 
Excise returns for a variety of commodities and manufactured goods, and are 
compiled in a set of sourcebooks, most notably the (Abstract of) British Historical 
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Statistics by B. R. Mitchell (originally together with Phyllis Deane)  and the English 
Overseas Trade Statistics by Elizabeth Boody Schumpeter. In addition, there is the 
pioneering work on economic growth by Walter Hoffmann, Phyllis Deane and W. A. 
Cole, later revisions by, among others, N. F. R. Crafts, C. K. Harley, Stephen 
Broadberry, Bruce Campbell, Alexander Klein, Mark Overton and Bas van Leeuwen, 
as well as the seminal studies on British industrial capital formation by François 
Crouzet, Charles Feinstein and Sidney Pollard.3 The analysis of this data in the 
Industrial Revolution literature generally proceeds by nominal decade, meaning 
1760-1770 and 1770-1780 for our timeframe. This practice is necessary for removing 
noise from long-run growth trends; however, it also removes some of the necessary 
detail for the shorter time scales we are interested in, and may even confuse the 
resulting picture by including 1763 with its possible positive displacement (and 
perhaps the negative impact of the simultaneous Continental crisis) along with the 
last three war years (1760-62). Similarly, any residual growth in the early 1770s may 
be obscured by including the effects of the 1772-3 crisis (and later of the American 
War) within the same decade under observation. 
It is more meaningful for our purposes to focus on the period 1763-72 as a 
unit and to compare it both with the crises (financial and political-military) that 
followed it, and also with an appropriate period preceding the posited 1763 
                                                     
3
 The literature is vast and active. The discussion in this chapter makes use of data, concepts, and 
aspects of the debate found in Deane and Cole, British economic growth, Boody Schumpeter, 
English overseas trade statistics, Mitchell and Dean, Abstract, Broadberry et al, British Economic 
Growth, 1270-1870, Crafts, British economic growth in the Industrial Revolution, Crouzet, Capital 
formation in the Industrial Revolution, Feinstein and Pollard, Studies in Capital Formation in the 
United Kingdom, Crafts, ‘British Economic Growth, A Review of the Evidence’, and ‘British 
Economic Growth, Some Difficulties of Interpretation’, Crafts and Harley, ‘Output growth and the 
industrial revolution’, Crafts, Leybourne, Mills, ‘Trends and cycles’, Harley, ‘British industrialization 
before 1841’, Jackson, ‘Rates of industrial growth’, Brezis, ‘Foreign capital flows in the industrial 
revolution’, Hoppit, ‘Counting the industrial revolution’, Williamson, ‘Why was British growth so 
slow?’, Berg and Hudson, ‘Rehabilitating the Industrial Revolution’ and ‘Growth and Change’, 




displacement. Unfortunately, the very nature of this period as a rare peaceful 
interlude between two major wars which makes it so attractive to study in the first 
place also makes it difficult to compare with a similar peaceful interval that is close 
to it in time. The obvious comparison is instead with the Seven Years War itself, 
which could furthermore help identify any displacement taking place in 1763. If the 
end of the war had such a significant impact as to eventually lead to the growth of a 
bubble, then we should be able to discern these changes by comparing the prevailing 
growth trends in these two periods. In some ways, looking back all the way to 1745-6 
would have been even better as this might have illustrated the effects of the 
Jacobite rebellion, the defeat of which was as much of a paradigm-shifting event 
(particularly for Scotland) as victory in the Seven Years War ever was. Unfortunately, 
the time series data, already sparse enough for the Eighteenth Century in general, 
become even sparser before 1750.4 
In order to have a better chance of capturing any displacement signals, our 
analysis will offset the Seven Years War period backwards by one year from its actual 
historical demarcation (1756-63). This is to include any specific 1763 effects 
(displacement and/or Continental crisis) within the "boom decade period", and 
conversely include any negative effects from the 1756 declaration of war within the 
wartime period. The comparison therefore will be between 1755-62 (the “Seven 
Years War”) and 1762-72 (the “Boom Decade”). As the time series are annual in 
nature, and as the 1772 crisis mostly occurred after midsummer when at least some 
of the commodities observed had had their accounting closed for that financial year, 
we will include 1772 itself in the “Boom Decade” period; any crisis effects should be 
apparent from 1773 onwards. Occasional shifts in this interval will be necessary to 
better capture (or exclude) the effects of 1772, especially for some Scottish trends 
                                                     
4
 For instance, Feinstein and Pollard’s analysis starts at 1750, at least when there are data they can 
use that go far back (which is not all that often).  
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which tend to include the negative influence of the crisis in the 1772 rather than 
1773 data point.5  
There have been several reservations expressed in the literature regarding the use of 
this time series data.6 These can be broadly summarised as follows: 
1. The data are inherently untrustworthy, as they fail to capture the effects of 
smuggling, evasion, and corruption among Revenue officials. 
2. The time series generally include only those commodities that were within 
the scope of the Revenue. They therefore comprise only a part of the 
economy, and not necessarily the most important part at that. Agriculture, 
household work, and non-marketed economic activity are among the most 
notable omissions. Similarly, the data tends to emphasize foreign over inland 
trade. 
3. Drawing conclusions for country-wide economic trends in this period is a 
precarious undertaking, as it implicitly assumes a greater degree of economic 
integration across Britain that there actually existed. Regional differentiation 
was the rule rather than the exception in the mid-eighteenth century. 
4. There are serious methodological difficulties with the economic sector 
weightings used to create indicators of aggregate economic activity.  
There are fair points in all of the above, particularly the observation that it is difficult 
to capture regional variations from such consolidated data. Nevertheless, none of 
these objections materially affect the essence of this exercise, which is to identify 
the potential precursors of a bubble in the 1760s. It is unlikely that one such could 
grow undetected in “invisible” areas of the economy like household work or non-
marketed economic activity, while at the same time not impacting at all those we do 
                                                     
5
 We shall return to this issue in the discussion of the crisis’ impact in Chapter 5. 
6
 For instance Hoppit, ‘Counting the industrial revolution’, pp. 183-5. 
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have data on. Moreover, such a “cottage industry bubble” would have been equally 
unlikely to have materially depended on financial credit for its maintenance, and 
thus to be negatively affected by the 1772 credit crunch. There were certainly non-
monetized credit relationships in local communities engaged in such work,7 but such 
credit did not generally depend on the sort of high finance that is supposed to have 
blown up the 1760s credit bubble. When it comes to smuggling and evasion, the 
shortness of the time period under observation may come to our aid. Smuggling 
trends certainly fluctuated over the Eighteenth Century, especially when new 
regulations were introduced or old ones repealed.8 Nevertheless, it is more than 
possible that in the absence of such legal externalities, the rate of change of 
smuggling and evasion trends was much slower than a potential credit- or 
psychologically-induced market mania. The controversy over sector weighting, while 
important enough in itself, can be partly bypassed by investigating each time series 
individually, or at most as a grouping of a small number that are strongly correlated.9 
For the same reason, we will also employ as basic (perhaps to the point of naiveté) a 
quantification methodology as possible. Specifically, for each period (“Boom decade” 
and “Seven Years War”) we will present a total return and a compound annual 
growth rate (henceforth: CAGR) as an expression of their growth trends. Similarly, 
we will include an average annual growth rate (henceforth: AAGR) and the standard 
deviation of annual returns as an expression of trend volatility. To quantify 
“displacement” we will present both the individual annual returns for 1762-3 (that is, 
a rough measure of the first derivative of the trend), and the difference in CAGR 
between the two periods under observation (that is, a rough measure of the second 
derivative of the trend). It must be stressed that we will not make an evaluation of 
                                                     
7
 Muldrew, Economy of Obligation and ‘Hard food for Midas’, Anderson ‘Money and the structure of 
credit’. 
8
 Cole, ‘Trends in Eighteenth-Century Smuggling’ and ‘Rejoinder’. 
9
 For instance the time series “retained raw cotton imports” in  Table2 is a simple difference of raw 
cotton imported less that re-exported. 
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the absolute growth rate for these individual time series, much less for the aggregate 
economy. Whether a growth rate of, say, 1% or 2% is “large” or “small” for this 
period is not pertinent to this analysis – we are merely looking for a “step change” in 
these growth rates that might justify claims of a displacement.  
For ease of interpretation we break up this simple analysis into four broad 
categories: Aggregate Economy, Production, Transport and Communication, and 
Foreign Trade. 
(a) Aggregate economy 
Table 1 presents three sets of aggregate growth indices: Hoffman’s original work 
from the 1950s, the revisions by Crafts and Harley in the 1980s and 1990s, and the 
most recent (2015) estimates by Broadberry et al. The latter include nominal and 
real (i.e. price-adjusted) estimates, as well as sectoral breakdowns. In order to put 
the older estimates into some comparative context with Broadberry’s real economy 
estimates, Table 1 also displays trends for consumer prices as expressed by the 
Schumpeter-Gilboy index. This latter measure indicates a slight post-war 
acceleration in inflation, particularly as expressed by the index of consumer goods. 
This could be attributable to a more vigorous post-war economy, or to money 
illusion caused by excessive paper money issuance. There is nothing, however, that 
could be described as either dramatic or definitive. Moreover, producer goods of the 
type that might be characterised as industrial precursors (for instance coal, bricks, 
lead, tiles, hemp, and so forth) in fact display price decreases, both in absolute and in 
relative CAGR terms. 
Given recent trends in the scholarship of the early Industrial Revolution, it is 
not surprising to see that newer estimates for economic growth tend to be lower 
than older ones. Under the Hoffman measure one might argue for both vigorous 
growth and an accelerating economy after the end of the Seven Years War. The later 
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Crafts-Leybourne-Mills (CLM) index of aggregate economic growth also 
demonstrates an observable, though smaller, positive shift. Depending on the 
specific version of the CLM index used, there is an increase in the CAGR between the 
two periods under observation between 1.3% - 3.8%.10 The latest estimates by 
Broadberry et al on the other hand show a negative (i.e. decelerating) CAGR 
between the two periods under observation, both in nominal and (especially) in real 
terms, which is inconsistent with the hypothesis of a post-war economic 
displacement. The displacement thesis is however somewhat salvaged even under 
these latest estimates when taking each individual sector of the economy separately: 
according to Broadberry et al, while both agriculture and services were actually 
contracting in absolute terms, industry was showing a modest but observable 
acceleration. This is consistent with the supposition of a dual economy being in 
operation, with a vibrant “new economy” in manufacturing and a sluggish or even 
receding “old economy” in agriculture and services. The effect is not dramatic but in 
principle could have resulted in a Minsky asset bubble, especially if this growth of 
new industry was heavily dependent on continual new injections of capital of the 
“Ponzi” or “Speculative” sort.  
(b) Production 
The picture arising from the individual, untreated and unweighted, time series for 
production is decidedly mixed. Most series show a healthy enough growth rate in the 
1760s, with the emblematic Industrial Revolution industries of textile and metals 
being predictably prominent. The pre-1772 growth narrative for textiles has been 
particularly emphatic in the literature for the case of Scotland, where the growth of 
its staple linen industry has been specifically mentioned by Hamilton as a major 
                                                     
10
 As there is a potential time lag in translating the effects of a displacement impulse (positive or 
negative) across the whole economy, for the case of these aggregate indices alone we define the 
effects of 1763 itself as the total return over the two year period 1762-4. For the same reason the 
impact of the 1772 crisis as discussed in Chapter 6 will include the index values for 1774 as well.  
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engine for the ‘long period of economic progress’ that peaked just before the Ayr 
Bank failure.11 Hamilton however identified the ‘Forty-Five rather than the Peace of 
Paris,12  as the major event that began this growth dynamic, and the times series 
trends related to Scottish linen manufactures bear this out (Table 2). Although both 
the quantities of linen stamped for duty and those exported certainly grew during 
our posited “Boom Decade”, they had grown even more strongly during the 
preceding war period. Growth rates in fact appear to have slowed down somewhat 
after 1763.  Other time series, for instance those for English printed goods (silks, 
linens, calicoes and stuffs) charged with duty do show some accelerating growth 
after 1763. Raw material trends (retained raw cotton and silk) are even more 
emphatic in showing a large positive CAGR change of as much as 16.4%, though 
these series are too volatile to draw firm conclusions for a possible displacement for 
the short time scales of the present investigation. Finally, the only proxy data for the 
leather industry that exists for this period (hides and skins charged with duty), 
demonstrates a mature industry growing slowly and displaying no notable positive 
jump in activity during our period. In all, there is a sense of this being a vibrant 
industry, but one without as yet possessing the sort of fundamental shift in activity 
that would in itself justify the formation of a bubble before 1772. 
Some of the time series associated with metals and mining (Table 3) also 
show a noticeable acceleration of growth between the two periods, particularly 
those for white tin paying coinage dues, copper sold at public ticketings in Cornwall 
and Devon (3.8), iron imports and exports, and above all for steel exports (a change 
in CAGR 11%). Growth in pig iron production in fact rather slowed down with the 
coming of peace. On the other hand, the coal production estimates given by Pollard 
for the whole 1755-1785 period show a consistent, but not obviously accelerating, 
                                                     
11
 Hamilton, ‘Ayr Bank’, p. 405. 
12
 Kindleberger, Manias, p. 123. 
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CAGR between 1.8-2.3%, though the quinquennial nature of this data prevents us 
from constructing trends specific to the 1763-72 period.13 One of the most important 
events taking place in the metals industry in this period was the establishment of 
Carron Company in Scotland in 1759 by the Englishmen Samuel Garbett and John 
Roebuck and the Scot William Cadell. In its first 15 years of existence the company’s 
affairs were dominated by another Englishman, Garbett’s son-in-law Charles (later 
Sir Charles) Gascoigne, who gradually pushed out the Roebuck and Cadell families.14 
We will return to the matter of the company’s finances and corporate politics in 
more detail in later sections. For the purposes of the present discussion it should be 
noted that there are hardly any figures to measure the company’s growth in this 
period. The first surviving sales figures date from 1773, after the company was 
officially chartered, and the first dividend returns from 1770.  
Growth trends in other production areas are inconclusive. The figures for 
brewing and non-colonial spirits (Table 4) are either too volatile (hops, spirits) or 
mostly conforming in their long term trends (malt, beer) to allow for any clear 
displacement signals. The weakly negative trend for small beer production in 
particular was part of a long time process which would see this commodity virtually 
abolished by the first decade of the Nineteenth Century.15 The picture arising from 
the miscellaneous production time series (soap, candles, starch, glass and paper) is 
similarly equivocal (Table 5). It must be stressed here that tax evasion for some of 
these commodities (for instance, soap) was reportedly so rampant as to make this 
data particularly unreliable.16 The same can be said even more assertively for the 
                                                     
13
 Pollard, ‘New estimate of coal production’. 
14
 Campbell, Carron Company, Norris, ‘Struggle for Carron’, Watters, Where iron runs like water. 
15
 For the brewing industry in general, see Mathias, Transformation of England, pp. 208-63. 
16
 Hoppit, ‘Counting the industrial revolution’, p. 179. 
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distillation of Scotch spirits, for which the crushing majority of operating stills were 
illicit.17 
(c) Transport and communications 
Large scale transportation projects have been prominent in the pre-1772 growth 
narrative. Hoppit has specifically singled out the initiation of seven new canal 
constructions between 1766-71 among the ‘many areas of economic advance in 
England’ in the 1760s, and noted ‘a marked peak’ in the number of turnpike acts in 
1770.18 William Albert explicitly identified a ‘Turnpike Mania’ beginning in the 1750s, 
though his figures suggest 1765 as the absolute legislative peak in that area (Figure 
2.6).19 Canals and turnpikes feature prominently on the Scottish side of the story as 
well, with Hamilton specifically mentioning the launching of the Forth & Clyde and 
Monkland projects in his macroeconomic setting of the Ayr Bank episode, while 
Ayrshire ‘led the way… with two general Turnpike Acts in 1766-7 and 1774’.20 Forth 
and Clyde Navigation in particular was a major undertaking, with over £128,000 in 
subscribed  capital and the Duke of Queensberry (who was at the head of the Ayr 
Bank project as well) appointed as chairman.21 In the same analysis, Hamilton also 
noted the growth of Scottish shipping, reporting an increase of almost 70% in total 
tonnage between 1760-72.22 
                                                     
17
Hamilton, Economic History, p. 106, gives an estimate of 400 illicit stills against only 8 licensed ones 
operating in Edinburgh alone in 1777. For more on the illicit Scotch whisky trade in the Eighteenth 
Century (though somewhat after the period examined here) see Devine, ‘Rise and Fall of Illicit 
Whisky-Making’. 
18
 Hoppit, ‘Financial Crises’, pp. 51-2. 
19
 Albert , The Turnpike Road System, p. 125. 
20
 Slaven, Development of west of Scotland, p. 38. 
21
 Hamilton, ‘Ayr Bank’, p. 406, Slaven, Development of west of Scotland, pp. 31-6. For a detailed look 
at the financial aspects of the Forth and Clyde canal project, see Forrester, ‘Early canal company 
accounts’.  
22
 Hamilton, ‘Ayr Bank’, as above. 
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Table 6 displays the trends in transportation investment, derived from 
Feinstein and Pollard’s data analysis.23 Aggregate figures are dominated by the 
broadly constant investment in parish highways, which dwarfed all other 
components in this period. Turnpike investment (an estimate of actual capital 
injected rather than simply the number of turnpike acts passed) shows a steady 
growth, although the CAGR differential after 1763 is a mere 1.4%. The growth in 
canal investment on the other hand is as dramatic as the traditional narrative would 
have it. Though in percentage terms the 375% increase taking place in 1759 is by far 
the biggest annual rise in this dataset and the reason behind the small apparent 
CAGR reduction during the “Boom Decade”, in absolute terms the million pound 
increase in the two year period 1769-70 can be truly characterised as spectacular, 
and briefly made this component the second largest in absolute terms. It should be 
noted that the time series of such a speculative and capital-intensive activity is 
predictably volatile, and that the start of the drastic upward trend predates 1763 by 
five years. Furthermore, canal construction was not the only investment in British 
waterways in this period; Acts of river improvement were being passed since the 
1660s, with a marked increase in their number (and capital diverted to them) in the 
second half of the Eighteenth Century.24 If anything however, all this rather 
reinforces the picture of a nascent canal investment mania that picked up pace as 
the 1760s drew towards their end. 
(d) Foreign trade 
Contemporaries identified above all the growth of trade as the main cause of the 
1772 crash, even when they resisted the temptation to characterise such growth as 
imprudent or speculative. They also focused on the use of bills of exchange as a 
                                                     
23
 Since their figures for 1772 seem to incorporate the effects of the crisis for this case alone we will 
truncate the “boom decade” at 1771. 
24
 Ward, Finance of canal building, pp. 1-17. 
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credit instrument to achieve this commercial expansion as the main agent which 
‘fanned the flames’ of the incipient mania. The anonymous author of the pamphlet 
Inquiry on the Late Mercantile Distresses in England and Scotland that was published 
shortly after the June 1772 crash could not have put the post-1763 displacement and 
monetary/credit expansion narrative more explicitly: 
The success which the Providence of the Almighty favoured us with, 
in the late war, extended our general commerce so far beyond its 
usual degree, that the Capitals of the most wealthy parts of the 
Kingdom became disproportioned to the amount of their dealings, 
and the deficiency was supplied by the established Credit of our 
Bills of Exchange, both foreign and domestic… Not only the 
merchants in this and several other Countries raised large sums 
upon the Credit of their Bills of Exchange, but even the Contractors 
of Supplies for the Armies, and the Financiers of Princes, anticipated 
their real Funds by the Circulation of Bills of Exchange  
Table 7 presents the foreign trade trends for England and Scotland. As might be 
expected of an economy that started from very lowly origins, Scottish growth rates 
consistently outperformed their English counterparts over both periods under 
observation. Scotland’s increasing share of the American tobacco trade from a fifth 
of the British total in 1744 to over half in 1769 was the most notable component of 
this expansion.25 There was even some growth in Scottish imports of sugar, rum, and 
cotton, though in absolute terms these were dwarfed almost to insignificance by 
their long-established English counterparts. Almost all of this activity was centred on 
the Clyde and destined for re-export to England and, increasingly, the Continent, 
particularly after Scottish firms like William Alexander and Sons (who played a 
                                                     
25
 Hamilton, Economic History, pp. 255-6, Slaven, Development of west of Scotland, pp. 20-4. 
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prominent part in the 1772-3 events) won the lucrative monopoly contract with the 
French Farmers-General.26 The adoption of non-importation agreements by the 
American colonists after 1765 had a predictably negative effect on trade volumes, 
but after most of the Townshend duties were repealed in 1770 Scottish tobacco 
imports once again grew rapidly, reaching an all-time high of 47 million lbs in 1771. 
As evidenced in Table 7, English tobacco imports seem to have been worse affected 
by the political situation, demonstrating a clear decline in volume between 1763 and 
1770, whereas their Scottish competitors appear to have weathered this particular 
storm far better.  
As always with trade figures from this period, one must be especially careful 
to consider the potential impact of smuggling. For instance, there are indications 
that the level of tobacco smuggling in Scotland consistently declined after 1750 
before picking up again in the mid-1770s.27 If this was indeed the case it would 
reduce real growth rates during our posited “Boom Decade”, as some of the 
observed expansion could well be caused by a shift from illicit to legal consumption. 
The same declining trend was originally observed by Cole as regards tea smuggling, 
though his methodology and conclusions have been disputed in later literature.28 
Tea smuggling was heavily influenced by the prevailing duty regime for this 
commodity in Britain, which not only remained consistently high up to the 
Commutation Act of 1784, but was also subject to frequent changes generally 
correlated with the state of war and peace. There were duty decreases in 1745 and 
1767, and increases in 1747 and 1759. In 1772 itself the relief given by the removal 
of the 1s per lb Excise duty in 1767 was repealed, and duty was even further 
increased in the 1770s until finally the Commutation Act of September 1784 
removed most of these burdens. War also served as a direct and perhaps even more 
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 Forbes, Memoirs of a banking-house, pp. 27-8. 
27
 Nash, ‘Tobacco trades, legal and illegal trade’, p. 367. 
28
 Mui & Mui, ‘Trends in smuggling reconsidered’. 
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drastic externality than wartime-inspired revenue measures. It has been assumed 
that throughout the Seven Years War the level of tea smuggling was materially 
depressed, since it sourced tea that was originally shipped to the Continent and 
which was accordingly not subject either to high duties or the EIC’s monopoly 
privileges. With the coming of peace many of the practical obstacles in shipping illicit 
commodities between the former belligerents were removed. According to the EIC’s 
(possibly exaggerated) complaints, tea smuggling had reached new heights during 
peacetime and even during the first phases of the American War, before the entry of 
France changed it into a European one. In either case, if the pattern of a consistent 
decline in smuggling as suggested by Cole is as true for tea as is for tobacco, then the 
differentials in real growth rates between the two periods under observation should 
be assumed to be somewhat lower than the nominal ones presented in Table 7.  
In any event, even these nominal figures on their own do not send any clear 
signal of a dramatic acceleration after 1763, but again rather point to a continuation 
of long-term trends. English exports and re-exports in fact slowed down to about 
half their wartime growth rate. The English sugar trade, both in volumes imported 
and revenues generated is a good example of a mature colonial trade that grew 
steadily but not spectacularly, even if its associated proxy of the African slave trade 
did experience a predictably positive impulse at the end of the war. Even in 
comparatively booming Scotland trade growth rates during the posited “Boom 
Decade” were consistently slower than during the war. The only discrepancy to this 
picture of gradual rather than accelerating growth concerns total English imports, 
which showed some significant acceleration in CAGR between 3.9% and 4.7%, 
depending on the specific measure used. This apparent paradox can be explained, 
however, by the realisation that this “foreign” trade data does not distinguish 
between genuine overseas trade and bilateral trade between England and Scotland: 
some of these growing English “imports” included a sizeable proportion of the more 
rapidly expanding Scottish re-exports.  
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Table 1. Aggregate economic trends, 1762-72 and 1755-62  
 
"Boom decade" (1762-72) 
 




Total CAGR AAGR Std Dev  Total CAGR AAGR Std Dev  Δ(CAGR) 1762-3 
Hoffman (industry, excluding building) 31.4% 2.8% 2.9% 6.4%  -6.3% -0.9% -0.8% 4.4%  3.7% -3.1% 
Hoffman (industry, including building) 16.9% 1.6% 1.6% 0.3%  2.0% 0.3% 0.3% 0.5%  1.3% 1.6% 
Crafts-Leybourne-Mills (Amended) 28.2% 2.5% 2.6% 4.5%  -8.7% -1.3% -1.2% 4.8%  3.8% 7.0% 
(a)
 
Crafts-Leybourne-Mills (Revised) 17.0% 1.6% 1.6% 3.5%  2.0% 0.3% 0.3% 3.5%  1.3% 5.6% 
(a)
 
Broadberry et al. (Nominal) 17.9% 1.7% 1.7% 3.3%  14.3% 1.9% 2.1% 5.8%  -0.3% 5.2% 
Broadberry et al. (Real) 3.8% 0.7% 0.4% 2.4%  11.4% 1.6% 1.6% 3.0%  -0.8% -0.3% 
Broadberry et al. (Real, Agriculture)
    
    
     
-6.8% -0.7% -0.2% 10.7%  18.4% 2.4% 2.7% 7.8%  -3.1% 1.1% 
Broadberry et al. (Real, Industry) 
    
    
    
19.0% 1.8% 1.9% 5.3%  0.8% 0.1% 0.2% 3.2%  1.6% 0.4% 
Broadberry et al. (Real, Services) 
    
    
    
-2.3% -0.2% -0.2% 2.7%  17.7% 2.4% 2.4% 2.3%  -2.6% -2.2% 




24.5% 2.2% 2.3% 4.9%  2.2% 0.3% 0.6% 8.2%  1.9% 6.4% 
S-G price index (non-cereals) 14.4% 1.4% 1.4% 3.1%  2.3% 0.3% 0.4% 3.2%  1.0% 2.2% 
S-G price index (producer goods) -3.9% -0.4% -0.4% 2.7%  12.1% 1.6% 1.7% 2.7%  -2.0% 0.0% 
(a)
 Two year return (1762-4) 
Primary data input sources (author’s calculations): Rows 1-2 Mitchell, British Historical Statistics, pp. 431. Rows 3-4 Crafts & Harley, ‘Restatement’, pp. 725-7. 
Rows 5-9 Broadberry et al., ‘British Economic Growth, 1270-1870’, dataset https://www.nuffield.ox.ac.uk/users/Broadberry/Nov2011FinalData1270-1870.xlsx, 
Rows 10-12 (including composition of indices), Mitchell & Deane, Abstract, pp. 347 & 469. 
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Table 2. Textile production trends, 1762-72 and 1755-62  
 
"Boom decade" (1762-72) 
 




Total CAGR AAGR Std Dev  Total CAGR AAGR Std Dev  Δ(CAGR) 1762-3 
Retained raw & thrown silk imports 
(a)
 140.8% 9.2% 14.2% 42.4%  -40.6% -7.2% 7.0% 62.4%  16.4% 127.9% 
Retained raw cotton imports 
(b)
 72.3% 5.6% 18.6% 56.3%  -21.6% -3.4% 0.1% 29.2%  9.0% -14.5% 
English linen piece good exports 50.0% 4.1% 5.2% 15.5%  133.0% 12.8% 14.8% 21.4%  -8.7% -1.8% 
Scottish linen stamped for sale (yards) 15.9% 1.5% 1.7% 6.5%  39.5% 4.9% 5.0% 6.6%  -3.4% 9.7% 
Scottish linen stamped for sale (value) 22.1% 2.0% 2.3% 8.8%  37.7% 4.7% 4.9% 7.6%  -2.7% 16.2% 
Scottish linen exports (yards) 
(c)
 -0.3% 0.0%    112.9% 11.4% 15.5% 35.7%  -11.4%  
Scottish linen exports (value) 
(c)
 5.1% 0.5%    111.8% 11.3% 15.3% 34.9%  -10.8%  
Printed goods stamped for duty 63.2% 5.0% 5.3% 8.4%  13.9% 1.9% 2.8% 14.9%  3.1% 4.9% 
Hides and skins charged with duty 1.5% 0.2% 0.2% 4.3%  11.0% 1.5% 1.5% 2.8%  -1.3% -2.2% 
(a)
 Raw silk imports + thrown silk imports – silk exports 
(b)
 Raw cotton imports – raw cotton re-exports
 
(c)
 Figures for 1763 and 1769 missing 
All figures for England and Wales only, unless otherwise specified. 













Total CAGR AAGR Std Dev  Total CAGR AAGR Std Dev  Δ(CAGR) 1762-3 
White Tin (volume) 22.3% 2.0% 2.3% 7.3%  -6.3% -0.9% -0.8% 6.0%  3.0% 5.9% 
White Tin (value) 19.8% 1.8% 2.1% 7.9%  -9.7% -1.5% -1.2% 8.5%  3.3% 12.6% 
Copper ore sold at public ticketings 72.0% 5.6% 6.9% 17.3%  13.4% 1.8% 2.2% 9.6%  3.8% 11.2% 
Lead and shot exports 16.2% 1.5% 2.6% 15.8%  9.7% 1.3% 2.2% 15.2%  0.2% 3.7% 
Iron imports (total) 29.6% 2.6% 4.2% 17.4%  1.7% 0.2% 2.2% 22.0%  2.4% 17.5% 
Iron exports (total) 75.9% 5.8% 8.7% 24.9%  -4.3% -0.6% 0.5% 15.7%  6.4% 23.4% 
Steel exports 107.5% 7.6% 10.6% 28.3%  -23.5% -3.7% 2.1% 35.2%  11.3% 2.1% 
Pig iron production (total) 
(a) 
9.6% 0.9% 1.0% 3.0%  17.4% 2.3% 2.4% 3.4%  -1.4% -1.0% 
 (a)
 Charcoal plus coal-fired furnaces. 
All figures for England and Wales only, unless otherwise specified.
  












Total CAGR AAGR Std Dev  Total CAGR AAGR Std Dev  Δ(CAGR) 1762-3 
Hops -59.4% -8.6% 94.8% 220.2%  -34.6% -5.9% 11.7% 81.3%  -2.7% -3.1% 
Malt 6.0% 0.6% 2.3% 19.8%  -6.9% -1.0% 0.9% 22.0%  1.6% -24.6% 
Strong Beer -0.3% 0.0% 0.0% 1.8%  3.0% 0.4% 0.6% 5.8%  -0.4% -1.1% 
Small Beer  -14.0% -1.5% -1.5% 2.8%  3.0% 0.4% 0.5% 4.1%  -1.9% -6.3% 
British Spirits (England) -21.6% -2.4% -1.6% 12.5%  -37.0% -6.4% -2.2% 29.2%  4.0% -27.8% 
British Spirits (Scotland) 28.8% 2.6% 3.5% 14.4%  -91.0%  -29.1% -20.7% 35.0%  31.6% -18.6% 
British Spirits (Ireland) 9.5% 0.9% 5.2% 33.4%  39.2% 4.8% 23.9% 65.1%  -3.9% -3.6% 
All figures for England and Wales only, unless otherwise specified.
  












Total CAGR AAGR Std Dev  Total CAGR AAGR Std Dev  Δ(CAGR) 1762-3 
White Glass 40.0% 3.4% 3.6% 6.3%  31.6% 4.0% 4.3% 8.3%  -0.6% -2.0% 
Common bottles 12.1% 1.2% 1.4% 6.8%  -17.7% -2.7% -2.2% 11.2%  3.9% 8.4% 
Paper (England) 25.1% 2.3% 2.3% 4.3%  16.4% 2.2% 2.2% 2.9%  0.1% 0.2% 
Paper (Scotland) 81.3% 6.1% 6.5% 9.6%  97.3% 10.2% 10.7% 11.2%  -4.1% 9.1% 
Soap 4.1% 0.4% 0.4% 1.2%  1.7% 0.2% 0.3% 2.3%  0.2% 0.7% 
Tallow Candles -2.5% -0.3% -0.2% 2.7%  23.8% 3.1% 3.2% 4.0%  -3.4% -1.2% 
Starch -3.8% -0.4% 3.6% 30.8%  9.9% 1.4% 4.1% 26.7%  -1.7% -1.1% 
All figures for England and Wales only, unless otherwise specified. 




Table 6. Investment trends in roads and waterways, 1762-71 and 1755-62  
 
"Boom decade" (1762-71) 
 




Total CAGR AAGR Std Dev  Total CAGR AAGR Std Dev  Δ(CAGR) 1762-3 
Total (Great Britain) 30.6% 3.0% 3.1% 4.8%  11.5% 1.6% 1.7% 4.6%  1.4% 1.2% 
Turnpikes (total) 52.6% 4.8% 5.3% 10.4%  23.1% 3.0% 3.2% 5.9%  1.8% 15.0% 
Turnpikes (England & Wales) 45.5% 4.3% 4.7% 10.7%  23.1% 3.0% 3.1% 5.7%  1.2% 15.2% 
Turnpikes (Scotland) 47.6% 4.4% 4.8% 9.8%  23.5% 3.1% 3.3% 7.5%  1.4% 14.3% 
Parish Highways (total) 0.9% 0.1% 0.1% 1.7%  0.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.7%  0.1% 1.4% 
Parish Highways (England & Wales) 0.8% 0.1% 0.1% 1.7%  0.4% 0.1% 0.1% 0.7%  0.0% 1.3% 
Parish Highways (Scotland) 2.3% 0.3% 0.3% 2.0%  -2.2% -0.3% -0.3% 0.8%  0.6% 2.3% 
Bridges (total) 27.9% 2.8% 9.9% 43.0%  186.7% 16.2% 31.7% 69.2%  -13.5% -32.6% 
Canals (total) 295.4% 16.5% 26.5% 45.7%  248.0% 19.5% 65.3% 151.3%  -3.0% -4.6% 








Figure 4. Investment trends in roads and waterways, 1755-85 (normalised: 1755=100). Individual trends plotted on the right 
hand axis, totals on the left hand one. Source: as per Table 6. 
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Total CAGR AAGR Std Dev  Total CAGR AAGR Std Dev  Δ(CAGR) 1762-3 
Total English imports (first cost) 50.0% 4.1% 4.4% 8.9%  1.6% 0.2% 0.7% 10.2%  3.9% 26.3% 
Total English imports (c.i.f.) 
(a)
 56.8% 4.6% 5.0% 10.1%  -0.5% -0.1% 1.3% 18.0%  4.7% 29.7% 
Total English re-exports 30.0% 2.7% 3.6% 13.8%  38.1% 4.7% 5.0% 8.7%  -2.1% 18.3% 
Total English exports 11.7% 1.1% 1.6% 11.2%  18.8% 2.5% 2.8% 9.2%  -1.4% 1.3% 
Total Scottish imports 70.9% 5.5% 6.1% 11.8%  52.3% 6.2% 7.7% 19.8%  -0.7% 27.5% 
Total Scottish exports 56.3% 4.6% 5.1% 11.4%  86.5% 9.3% 10.2% 14.6%  -4.7% 9.3% 
Sugar imports (volume, England) 32.3% 2.8% 4.8% 20.8%  13.9% 1.9% 3.3% 19.2%  1.0% 30.5% 
Sugar imports (volume, Scotland)
 (b)
 105.9% 7.5%    21.3% 2.8%    4.7%  
Sugar imports (value, England) 21.7% 2.0% 3.4% 17.2%  22.1% 2.9% 11.9% 52.5%  -0.9% 21.3% 
Sugar imports (value, Scotland) 
(b)
 105.1% 7.4%    21.9% 2.9%    4.6%  
Slave ship departures to the West Indies 76.1% 5.8% 6.6% 13.6%  26.0% 3.4% 5.7% 19.9%  2.5% 34.8% 
Slave ship arrivals to the West Indies 
(c)
 50.4% 4.2% 5.2% 16.2%  2.7% 0.4% 1.7% 25.5%  3.8% 44.2% 
Tobacco imports (volume, England) 16.8% 1.6% 3.9% 23.7%  -10.2% -1.5% 1.7% 28.5%  3.1% 47.7% 
Tobacco imports (volume, Scotland) 
(b)
 69.5% 5.4%    75.7% 8.4%    -3.0%  
Tobacco imports (value, England) 16.7% 1.6% 3.7% 22.6%  -10.2% -1.5% 15.6% 71.8%  3.1% 47.6% 
Tobacco imports (value, Scotland) 
(b)
 69.4% 5.4%    75.9% 8.4%    -3.0%  
(a)
 Cost, insurance and freight 
(b)
 Figures for 1763 and 1769 missing 
(c)
 Periods offset by one year forward (hence the column groups should read: 1763-73, 1756-63, and 1763-4) to capture delay in sailing ship arrivals 
Sources: Rows 1-4, Dean & Cole, British Economic Growth, Appendix I, pp. 320-1. Rows 5-6, 8, 10, 14, 16, Hamilton, Economic History, pp. 414-9. Rows 7, 9, 13, 15, 




 The potential role of finance in inflating a 1763-72 bubble 
Bearing in mind the reservations about the sometimes dubious quality and non-
representative nature of the data, not to mention the extreme simplicity of the 
methodology employed to analyse it, we can still conclude from the preceding 
section that the patterns of growth for the period 1763-72 do not constitute an 
unequivocal macroeconomic displacement signal. That does not imply that the 
economy was stagnant: most sectors for which data survive grew more or less 
healthily, and some particular ones (such as textiles, mining, and canal construction) 
could be even characterised as buoyant. But the picture is never uniform even within 
narrow sectors, while the correlation of any growth dynamic with the end of the 
Seven Years War is not especially strong. In some cases the prevailing rates of 
growth during the so-called 1763-72 “boom” were not materially different from, and 
in fact were occasionally lower than, those prevailing during the war. In others the 
dynamic predated 1763 by some time, for instance in the case of Scottish colonial 
trades where the trend originated in the late 1740s rather than 1763. When it comes 
to 1763 itself, there is always the possibility that any positive displacement arising 
from the signing of the Peace of Paris was partly or wholly counterbalanced by the 
negative effects of the Continental financial crisis taking place at the same time. The 
end of wartime finance and the monetary contraction caused by Prussia’s sudden 
revaluation of its currency may have been imported to Britain and dampened any 
euphoria there – even if euphoria at the victory was indeed present, which 
considering the unpopularity of the treaty in some parts of the British press is far 
from certain.29 
A Minsky bubble could have yet resulted if the post-1763 period was 
characterised by an overly rapid financial expansion, especially if its object were the 
                                                     
29
 Colley, Britons, pp. 102-18. 
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aforementioned speculative new industries. Simply put, there are two broad 
interconnected functions for finance. The first is the channelling of capital from 
savings to investment: fixed and circulating (working) capital for businesses, and 
consumption capital (including housing) for individuals. The second is operational: 
the provision of saving facilities, the facilitation of long distance payments, and the 
provision of monetary surrogates in lieu of, or in addition to, specie. Modern 
literature is equivocal over the role of finance in providing fixed capital to mid-
eighteenth century British industry. Although Britain was already one of the richest 
countries in Europe, the accumulation and reinvestment of private savings into 
industry may have been “crowded out” by the Government’s frequent needs for 
wartime credits. Government debt was abundant, liquid, and secure, while the rise 
in consol yields during wartime made them more attractive by comparison with the 
expected rates of return and perceived risk of investments in agricultural 
improvement or new industries.30 In the period under observation, the British 
Government built up large deficits during the Seven Years and American wars, with 
an interlude of small surpluses between 1766-76 (Figure 5). Consol yields were highly 
correlated with the amount of outstanding Government debt, dropping almost one 
full percentage point at the end of the Seven Years War and remaining steady until 
1776 at around 3.4% (Figure 6). It is thus possible that as state needs for credit were 
scaled back and consol yields became less attractive to investors after 1763, more 
capital could have been diverted to private investment.31 
                                                     
30
 This simple loanable funds argument is presented in more detail in Neal, ‘Finance of business’, pp. 
154-5. Temin and Voth, Prometheus Shackled, pp. 167-8, demonstrate a strong negative 
correlation in the lending practices of several London private banks (Child’s and Hoare’s) with the 
borrowing requirements of the Government . See also Williamson, ‘Why was British growth so 
slow?’ and Mokyr, ‘Has the industrial revolution been crowded out?’ for a discussion on crowding 
out, though one focusing on the Napoleonic Wars rather than the period under investigation here. 
31
 See Sussman and Yafeh, ‘Institutional reforms’, for a study on the correlation of the political 
environment with that of the interest the British Government had to pay in this period. See also 
North & Weingast, ‘Constitutions and commitment’, for perhaps the best known exposition of this 
tradition, and Coffman et al., Questioning credible commitment, for a  challenge to it. 
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In itself this is not sufficient as a potential displacement impulse, as demand 
for fixed capital arguably remained modest, even after large-scale machinery 
became more widely available for major industrial activities such as coal mining.32 
Instead, there was a more pressing need for circulating capital and the facilitation of 
payments, particularly so for foreign trade where outlays and receipts could be 
significantly out of phase in an era of sailing ships and horse-drawn carriages. 
Tobacco importation is a good example of such a relatively capital-intensive 
commercial activity in this period, and one which moreover displayed the apparent 
paradox of its being increasingly dominated by Scottish merchants.33 It is also a 
prime candidate for being part of a bubble in the real economy, being concentrated 
in exactly the same geographical area and among the same merchant community 
that the Ayr Bank operated. Scottish success, however, was not a result of better 
access to abundant capital or a financial mania of any sort. As we have seen, the 
trend existed well before the new, supposedly reckless, lending of the likes of the 
Ayr Bank could have been a factor; it is anyway a stretch to even imagine that the 
meagre financial resources of Scotland could have been responsible for forming a 
bubble, especially when compared to her much larger and richer neighbour. The 
growth of the Scottish market share of the trade was rather founded on the cost 
advantage Scots importers enjoyed over their English competitors, partly due to the 
cheapness of locally produced manufactured goods that were supplied to the 
colonists in exchange for tobacco,34 but more importantly because of the 
organisational advantages of their operations in America. 
                                                     
32
 Postan, ‘Recent trends in the accumulation of capital’, Pollard, ‘Fixed capital’, Pressnell, Country 
Banking, pp. 322-43, Mathias, Transformation of England, 88-109, Temin and Voth, Prometheus 
Shackled, pp. 148-75, Cameron, Banking in the early stages of industrialization, p. 36-8, Flinn, Coal 
Industry, pp. 192-3. 
33
 Price, Capital and Credit, p. 124. 
34
 Hamilton, Economic History, pp. 259, has estimated that £100 of Glasgow goods purchased £230 of 
tobacco in Virginia, although this margin may have incorporated the advantageous exchange 
between sterling and the Virginia currency. 
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 The tobacco trade with Britain followed two distinct business models.35 The 
older system, usually adopted by London traders and involving the produce of large 
plantations, was the “plantation” or consignment system. This involved the colonial 
planter arranging for a British trader to assume the costs and risks of storing and 
marketing his entire crop in Europe (though not those associated with shipping and 
insuring it) in exchange for a commission. The merchant in turn arranged for the 
purchases of manufactured and consumer goods required by the planter and 
shipped them by return vessel. Any deficit (as was usually the case) between the 
price of the crop and that of the European goods was financed by the British 
merchant and secured on the planter’s personal bond. The newer “commercial”, or 
store-based, system, which became increasingly prevalent among Glasgow traders 
after 1750, involved dispatching factors to America as “supercargoes”, or recruited 
them among many the Scottish emigrants in the colonies. They in turn set up stores 
in the colonies which purchased tobacco directly  from planters and sold European 
goods to them on credit. Title to the crop passed to the factor on purchase, and all 
freight and insurance costs for transportation to Europe were assumed by the store. 
As with the case of the consignment system, any deficit incurred by the planter was 
financed by the British store owner and secured on land mortgages. Planters, both 
under the consignment and commercial systems of trade, generally ran credit 
balances with their British counterparties for at least twelve months which required 
periodic rolling-over, although store credit generally consisted of numerous small 
sized debts compared to the larger balances run in the consignment trade. The 
commercial system became increasingly popular as it proved better suited to the 
needs of smaller farmers and planters; by 1775 over three-quarters of Virginia 
tobacco were traded under it.36 The reason for this was once again cost: Scottish 
                                                     
35
 Sheridan, ‘1772 and the American colonies’, pp. 168-71, Soltow, ‘Scottish traders in Virginia’, pp. 
83-98, Land, ‘Economic behavior in a planter society’. 
36
 Sheridan, ‘1772 and the American colonies’, p. 169 
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ships achieved much quicker turn-around times due to the presence of their 
affiliated factors on the spot, who could arrange for the shipment of the produce of 
the smaller planters they traded within a more flexible manner than for the case of 
large consignments. Shipping to Glasgow rather than London also enjoyed the 
advantage of a round-trip that was shorter by four to six weeks, and which followed 
a route that was mostly immune to hostile action in case of war, unlike the Channel 
route typically used by English importers. Since freight charges could range from a 
third to a half of the prime cost of tobacco, the savings achieved by Glasgow 
merchants were substantial, and allowed them to be much more competitive in the 
prices they offered to planters.37 
 It has been estimated that an investment of four times the cost of each 
hogshead of tobacco imported was necessary for the store system to function, not 
only because of the capital expenditure required in setting up the network of 
overseas stores, but also due to planters running chronic deficits with their European 
counterparties. A contemporary estimate put it that £55,000 in goods and credit 
needed to be invested for an annual import rate of 2,200 hogsheads, at the time 
selling for £6 each.38 These capital requirements may have been partly behind the 
consolidation of the industry to a few large firms, which fell from 91 in 1728-31 to 
only 38 in 1773.39 Some of these firms, like John Glassford & Co., or the Buchanan 
and Cunninghame groups of interconnected partnerships, were large concerns with 
tens of established stores in America and turnovers in the hundreds of thousands of 
pounds.40 Finance may have played a part in aiding this consolidation, and it 
certainly provided the payment facilities and short-term liquidity (especially through 
the discounting of bills of exchange) for the industry to expand.  
                                                     
37
 Hamilton, Economic History, p. 259. Price, ‘Rise of Glasgow’, pp. 187-90. 
38
 Devine, Sources of capital, pp. 116-7. 
39
 Hamilton, Economic History, p. 266. 
40
 Soltow, ‘Scottish traders in Virginia’, p. 85,  Hamilton, Economic History, p. 266. 
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 In other words, a mania could have still ensued after 1763 if the prevailing 
credit and monetary conditions “fanned the flames” of a convincing growth narrative 
with sufficient vigour – even for a case where the initial spark was as apparently 
innocuous as economic growth during the not-so-booming 1760s. More specifically, 
financial mechanisms could have destabilised the system in four ways:  
1. Through an equity-led expansion, spearheaded by the establishment of 
speculative projects like the celebrated “Bubble Companies” of 1719-20.41  
2. Via a credit bubble in long- or short-term debt, and directed to either (or 
both) consumption or industrial investment.  
3. Through a rapid monetary expansion through the extensive use of paper 
money, or of short term money-market instruments like bills of exchange. 
4. By constructing such financial connections as to enable the rapid 
transmission of an exogenous shock across the financial network; in other 
words, by providing vectors of financial contagion. 
These mechanisms are neither mutually exclusive nor necessarily independent of 
each other. Credit growth may well be speculative, often irrationally so; indeed, in 
the 1760s it is supposed to have been just that. Equity-funded projects can be 
backed by investors following a rational momentum investment strategy, or by a 
“mad crowd” gripped by an “irrational frenzy”, or by naïve newcomers to the market 
exploited by corrupt insiders. Similarly, elaborate chains of bills of exchange could 
serve (indeed as we will see, did serve) as short-term money market instruments, as 
monetary surrogates in lieu of specie, and as vectors of contagion once the shock hit.  
                                                     
41
 The true nature of these supposedly frivolous projects has been re-examined in later literature and 





The greatest part of equity capital available to businesses in this period originated in 
the ploughing-back of retained earnings. This was (and remains) a method that was 
by definition limited by the firm’s profitability and, by construction, not suitable for 
start-up capital. Conventional equity and debt were necessary for the latter. The 
raising of new equity was however legally constrained in England through the 
provisions of the 1720 Bubble Act,42 which forbade the establishment of joint-stock 
companies without the prior authorisation of an Act of Parliament or a Royal 
Charter. A further restriction specific to financial institutions arose from the 
monopoly provisions of the Bank of England Act of 1708,43 which forbade the 
establishment of any banking corporations and restricted private banking 
partnerships to a maximum of six partners. This legal framework practically confined 
most businesses to the status of unincorporated private partnerships. Such entities 
had no separate legal personality from their partner-owners, nor a managerial 
hierarchy separate from them. There was no easy transferability of equity stakes, 
and partnerships did not have a perpetual existence like modern incorporated firms 
do. Death, retirement, or a change in status by one of the partners (for instance 
through bankruptcy) could lead to the end of the partnership and the need for it to 
be set up again from scratch. As partners were the legal party in any contracts struck 
by the firm and had to be named in litigation, they were ultimately liable for its debts 
in an unlimited manner. Unlimited liability remained the universal condition of 
                                                     
42
 6 Geo. I, c. 18. The following presentation of the English business legal framework closely follows 
Harris, Industrializing English Law, pp. 14-36. For the effects of the Bubble Act see Harris, ‘The 
Bubble Act: its passage and its effects on business organization’, Patterson and Reifen, ‘The effects 
of the Bubble Act on the market for joint-stock shares’. 
43
 7 Anne, c. 30. 
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private firms until the Limited Liability Act of 1855.44 In this period there were no 
limited partnerships with “sleeping partners” only liable for their equity stake.  
Scotland enjoyed a somewhat more flexible regime. Although in principle the 
Bubble Act applied there as well, the observation of its provisions was more cursory, 
while the BOE monopoly did not extend north of the Tweed.45 Scots could form 
unincorporated companies of more than six partners, including for banking, and 
could in theory escape the practical equity capital restrictions imposed on their 
English counterparts. These larger Scottish “co-partnerships” were however not the 
same as joint-stock companies in that their shares were not freely transferrable. Nor 
were they established in perpetuity: their duration was typically limited between 7 
and 21 years.46 Finally, although the issue of a separate legal personality for such 
companies was an unresolved rather than an unequivocal fact,47 the unlimited 
liability of partners was still the universal rule.  
Non-bank joint-stock corporations could still be established according to the 
provisions of the Bubble Act, while entities like the EIC, the BOE, and the South Sea 
Company had been prominent parts of the business landscape for decades. The 
corporation concept pre-dated the Bubble Act, having arisen from the medieval 
concept of the Crown granting privileges to groups, such as townships, universities, 
ecclesiastical institutions, and guilds. In contrast to partnerships, corporations had 
separate legal personalities from their proprietors. This directly implied that they 
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were continuous in their existence, could make internal byelaws, own land, and 
receive further privileges (such as monopolies) from the state. Their shares were 
freely transferrable, and could thus be traded (and speculated upon) in the 
secondary market. Most notably, their separate legal personality implied some 
measure of limited liability for their proprietors.  
The most prominent case of major new joint-stock equity raising in this 
period was the financing of canal projects (Table 8). In addition to the Forth & Clyde 
and Monkland projects in Scotland already mentioned, nine more canals were 
initiated in England between 1755-71. With the exception of the Duke of 
Bridgewater navigations which were financed through the Duke’s estate (in itself a 
form of profit plough-back), the other eight were undertaken according to the 
provisions of the Bubble Act.48 In total, almost £700,000 were committed by the 
proprietors of these projects, who came from a diverse part of the country and a 
broad section of society, from peers, to manufacturers, merchants, and even widows 
and tenant farmers.49 Nevertheless, not all this equity was paid-up at the time of 
incorporation; the schedule of calls on proprietors for portions of their total 
commitment followed closely the progress of construction in a manner akin to 
modern “project finance”. Therefore, although £700,000 in stock capital may have 
been eventually committed, only a fraction of that was actually invested before 
1772. 
The other signature transportation project in this period, the turnpike, 
involved a third type of business organisation: the trust. Trusts were often 
concerned with land, with proprietors holding formal title and beneficiaries having 
its use, which made them ideal for turnpike projects. In practical terms, trusts fell 
somewhere between partnerships and corporations: though limited in their lifespan 
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in the way of partnerships, they could attract more than six subscribers. For the case 
of turnpike trusts specifically, these subscribers financed the project through debt 
rather than equity, even though the establishment of the trust still required the 
passage of an enabling Act of Parliament.50 After 1750, turnpike trusts increasingly 
obtained contractual commitments from subscribers prior to the passage of their 
enabling Acts in a manner similar to joint-stock equity subscriptions. 
Parliamentary approval was also a prerequisite (by definition) of 
parliamentary enclosure, another growing activity in the 1760s. Of the nearly 5300 
enclosures enacted by Parliament after 1750, over 37% fell between 1755 and 
1780,51 and there was an observable peak during our “Boom Decade” (Figure 7). 
Nevertheless, it has been disputed that enclosure required substantial investment 
either of equity or of mortgage debt. It seems that much of the process was instead 
financed through sales of a portion of the land being enclosed. This could not have 
been a financial operation that would have easily led to the growth of a bubble, 
being by construction self-limiting: there was a finite amount of land that could have 
been sold, and land prices would have anyway fallen in case of a land glut caused by 
an enclosure “mania”. Land sales were also painful enough to both landlords and 
tenants as to make psychological euphoria equally unlikely. Nevertheless, any 
substantial monetary contraction could still affect the process of enclosure, through 
a lack of wherewithal to effect such land sales. Figure 7 does indeed seem to point to 
such a retrenchment in the early 1780s, a pattern that is closely correlated to the 
unsuccessful turn in the American War and the aligning of several major European 
powers against Britain after 1778.  
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It is difficult to estimate whether there was a substantial increase in the 
1760s in the amounts of new equity capital raised in those sectors of the economy 
that were dominated either by individuals or by private partnerships. The restrictions 
of the Bubble Act and those examples that do survive can provide some idea of a 
rough ceiling for the amounts involved, and are especially evident in the structure of 
the quintessentially capital intensive business of banking. The special case of the BOE 
aside, banks were not lavishly capitalised operations - the six partner rule, even if it 
came to six very rich partners, was just too restrictive. The London bank of Barclay, 
Bevan and Bening (one of the precursors of modern Barclays Bank) had £20,000 in 
equity all through the 1760s; Goslings, a merchant bank with notable East India 
connections, had only £9,000 in 1773, though this may have been an artefact of its 
change of partner share structure that year; Mason, Currie, James and Yallonby 
(better known as Curries Bank) was the best capitalised example for whom 
shareholders’ equity figures survive, having £30,000 in 1776.52 Country banks were 
of similar scale: the Bristol Old Bank (Lloyd, Elton, Miller, Tyndall, Gillam & Edye - one 
of the earliest English country banks) was well capitalised with £27,000 in 1773; the 
Newcastle Old Bank on the other hand had only £2,000 at the peak of the supposed 
bubble in 1771.53 The historian of English country banking, L. S. Pressnell, has 
plausibly estimated an average of £10,000 in shareholders’ equity for country banks 
of this era.54 For London banks the £16,000 of the emblematic 1772 firm, NJFD, can 
be considered as typical.55 
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In principle, the somewhat looser Scottish legal regime could have allowed 
for more rapid equity growth of private banks, though the comparative poverty of 
the country and the initial hostility of the chartered Edinburgh banks to new banking 
co-partnerships limited such opportunities somewhat.56 The Dundee Banking 
Company was established in 1763 by 36 founding partners with £12,600 of 
subscribed capital, which was comparable to that of Coutts Bank, a Scottish-owned 
private partnership in London with £12,000 in partners’ equity through most of the 
1760s.57 The Perth United Banking Company’s resources were larger at £32,000 in its 
founding year of 1766, and that of the Banking Company of Aberdeen even more 
substantial at £98,000 and 197 founding partners in 1767.58 Above all others, the Ayr 
Bank was founded in 1769 with £96,000 of subscribed capital and 136 founding 
partners, rising to £163,000 and 237 respectively by the time of its stoppage in June 
1772. As with the case of the canal companies however, these were only notional 
commitments, and the actual paid-up equity could be substantially lower. The Ayr 
Bank’s partners had been called for only 65% of their commitments (a little over 
£104,000) by the time of the crisis, three years after the bank’s foundation.  
All too often the partners of private banks were merchants or manufacturers 
who had branched out into banking as a means to finance their primary business. 
Equally often it was that business that provided them with the start-up capital and 
the regular cash flow stream on which they built and grew their banking activities.59 
A typical example were the founding partners of NJFD, two of whom had originally 
been brewers.60 Sir Richard Glyn of Glyn & Halifax had originally been a dry-salter.61 
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Start-up banking capital could also become available to those whose professional or 
public function entailed the warehousing of funds, such as officers of the Revenue or 
legal professionals like scriveners who were involved in the conveyance of 
property.62 The best example of this sort in 1772 is John Fordyce of Ayton, 
Berwickshire, a distant cousin of NJFD’s Alexander Fordyce and brother-on-law to 
the Duke of Gordon.63 Leveraging his position as Receiver-General for Scotland, this 
Fordyce rapidly grew his banking business with a partnership in Edinburgh and a 
corresponding house in London.64 
The only practical way that a broad equity-led bubble could have grown in 
the 1760s would have been either through large share capital increases for joint-
stock companies, a proliferation of new private partnerships by absolute number, or  
a major increase in the retained earnings of existing companies (both private and 
joint-stock) that could be then ploughed back into the business. Again, it is difficult 
to produce reliable representative figures for any of this. Joint-stock companies with 
freely traded shares in the secondary market could always raise new equity capital 
by selling stock, after appropriate Parliamentary approval. In Scotland, both the Bank 
of Scotland and the Royal Bank were to do just that, but only did so after the 1772 
events.65 A bullish stock trading environment, like that prevailing in East India stock 
between 1766-9, could have helped attract prospective shareholders in expectation 
of increased dividends. Even though it is plausible that the East India share trading 
saga may have led to the 1772 crash, it is more likely to have done so via a 
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conventional secondary trading mania rather than a Minsky bubble initiated by a 
major injection of new equity capital to “speculative” and “Ponzi” economic units.66 
As far as a possible proliferation of new partnerships goes, banking is again 
one of the growth areas for which we have a clearer picture. With country banks 
becoming established in both England and Scotland after 1740, numbers were 
definitely rising. Joslin estimated that the number of London private banks grew by 
almost 50% between 1754 and 1770 (Figure 8).67 Pressnell mentioned ‘crops of new 
[country] banks in the early fifties, in 1765-6 [and] in 1770-1’, but could not provide 
accurate statistics for this period beyond an estimate that the total number of 
English banks of both types stood at around 150 in 1776.68 There is better detail 
when it comes to Scottish banking as its scale was much smaller. From a situation 
before the ‘Forty Five when the whole system essentially consisted of the two older 
Edinburgh chartered banks, by 1772 there were 31 banks in total: 3 were chartered 
“public” banks, 19 were private partnerships of the English type and all but one 
located in Edinburgh, and 9 were provincial co-partnerships, including the newly 
established Ayr Bank.69 This was undoubtedly a growth industry, and although we 
only have the rough impressions on the equity capitals committed in it as outlined 
above, it did attract a fair amount of it. Rondo Cameron’s very rough estimates for 
this period use Pressnell’s £10,000 average for each of the 100 country banks and his 
own estimate of £30,000 for each of the 50 London private ones, bringing the total 
equity capital committed in banking alone at £2.5 million.70 Since Cameron used the 
outlier of Currie’s bank as representative of London bank capitalization, his estimates 
are however almost certainly overstated. As discussed earlier, a figure nearer half 
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that would be more appropriate, bringing the total equity commitment in this sector 
to £1.75-2 million at most. Another £500,000 was committed in Scottish banks by 
1772, with the Ayr Bank’s ample capital resources making up over a fifth of this.71 
That said, there is nothing to imply a particularly abnormal, or bubble-like, growth. It 
cannot be ruled out that other sectors of the economy, particularly in industry, might 
be growing more dramatically than that, but there is a marked lack of contemporary 
reports on such an industrial partnership “frenzy”. What numbers do survive are 
modest: the Carron ironworks, as major a new industrial undertaking as any, were 
founded by seven partners committing an initial share capital of £12,000 in 1759.72 
The four industrial examples given by François Crouzet (the brewers Truman, 
Hanbury & Buxton, and the foundries of Coalbrookdale, Cheadle Brass, and Walker & 
Co.) show figures of similar magnitude: Truman was the only one that was well 
capitalised at £23,000 in its foundation year of 1741; Coalbrookdale was set-up with 
£2,800 in 1709, Cheadle Brass with £3,600 in 1734, and Walker & Co. with a mere 
£600 in 1746. 
Retained earnings and additional contributions from existing partners could 
help a company grow, but such growth was ultimately capped by the profitability of 
the company and the personal wealth of the partners, which in turn determined 
what fraction of these profits could be taken out as dividends. Growth could still be 
vigorous: Crouzet’s four examples displayed an average annual equity growth of 
3.68%, 4.17%, 4.95% for Truman, Coalbrookdale and Cheadle Brass respectively, and 
a spectacular 16.92% for the initially tiny Walker & Co. Much more instructive than 
simple growth rates, however, is the realisation that the initially well capitalised 
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Truman excepted, the other three enterprises had not reached more than £30,000 in 
capital stock each by 1770.73 Truman was indeed a major company by this date with 
over £100,000 in accumulated capital, a figure that was comparable to that reached 
by the more famous Carron Company. In January 1769, Sir Charles Gascoigne 
calculated that in ten years after its establishment the Carron partners had paid in an 
additional £62,000; inclusive of nominal interest on these shareholder contributions 
and after subtracting dividends paid out, the capital account had grown above 
£85,000 and continued to do so afterward.74 Three years later, just as the credit 
crisis struck, the company wrote to the two older Edinburgh chartered banks asking 
for assistance and describing how the company ‘[employed] at Carron a Capital of 
One Hundred Thousand Pounds & upward paid in by the partners’.75 Even so, the 
company considered itself significantly undercapitalised for the projects it was 
undertaking and the expansion it was envisaging. This shortfall was calculated by 
Gascoigne at over £80,000 in his 1769 calculations. Some of this he attempted to 
make up through a 10% call on existing partners, which however did not prove 
fruitful. He therefore had to turn to the second, and arguably greater, method of 
raising capital: debt. 
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Figure 5. Total Government budget balance (total net income less total state expenditure) for 
Great Britain, 1755-85, in thousands of pounds sterling. Source: Mitchell and Deane, Abstract, pp. 





Figure 6. Total nominal public debt outstanding (left axis) and prevailing consol yield (right axis), 1755-85. Note: consol yield data 
start at 1756. Source: Mitchell and Deane, Abstract, pp. 390-1 (outstanding debt), p. 455 (consol yield). 
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Sankey Navigation 1755 1761 18,600  120 155 - 
Duke of Bridgewater Navigation 
(a)





Trent and Mersey Canal 1766 1777 86,900 130,000 655 200 166,600 
(c)
 
Staffordshire and Worcestershire Canal 1766 1772 98,000  700 140 - 
Birmingham Canal Navigations 1768 1798 70,000  500 140 - 
Coventry Canal 1768 1790 50,000  500 100 - 
Oxford Canal 1769 1790 141,200 150,000 1412 100 - 
Leeds and Liverpool Canal 1770 1816 172,400 260,000 1919 N/A - 
Chesterfield Canal 1771 1777 55,000 100,000 N/A N/A 50,000 
(a)
 Non-joint stock project 
(b)
 Loan by Child & Co., London, repaid in 1769 
(c)
 Three loan tranches in 1770, 1775 and 1776, no details on distribution of funds between them 
All monetary amounts in pounds sterling 





Figure 7. Total enclosure Acts of Parliament (arable plus waste and common land), 1730-99 by half-decade totals. Source: 








As with the case of equity and the Bubble Act, the amount of debt that a firm could 
raise in this period was also practically restricted by the law, though in this case 
implicitly rather than explicitly. Between 1713 and 1832, usury laws forbade the 
taking of interest above 5 per cent per annum.76 This hard ceiling made debt markets 
‘more rigid in price and less certain in supply’,77 and thus less efficient. This could 
become a serious problem at times when real interest rates rose above this nominal 
interest ceiling, such as during a credit crisis like the one in 1772, or when wartime 
government finance “crowded out” private borrowers. In such cases, potential 
creditors would not find an adequate return for the risk they were asked to incur, 
and could accordingly retreat from the market leaving otherwise perfectly 
creditworthy potential debtors without a reliable source of funds. There were of 
course ways to circumvent the usury restriction, just as there had always been. The 
most notable one in 1772 was the issuance of redeemable annuities. These were 
personal (and thus non-transferrable) debt obligations, sometimes perpetual but 
more often linked to the lifespans of one or two named beneficiaries. As implied by 
the term, annuities were usually redeemable at the option of the borrower who 
could at any point refund the principal to the creditor. The taking of interest was not 
explicit and therefore not subject to the usury laws. The creditor purchased the 
specific annuity stream from the borrower for a lump sum paid up front. This 
purchase sum could vary with the abundance or scarcity of money, as well as with 
the perceived risk of the borrower, thus effectively allowing the implied interest rate 
to float according to prevailing market conditions. Annuities were not a panacea, 
being a legal grey area, and through their non-transferability not as convenient as 
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other credit instruments. Nevertheless, they remained an outlet that allowed the 
credit market to clear at times of distress.78  
In another similarity with equity capital, the lack of a separate legal 
personality for private partnerships, and the state of unlimited liability for partners, 
meant that the distinction between personal and commercial credit was never clear-
cut. This was as true of the origination of debt as it was of its use. It was individual 
partners who more often than not borrowed the funds and provided the necessary 
security for them. This security also tended to be personal in nature, and as such 
could also draw from a store of personal goodwill and informal favours obtained by 
individual partners in addition to contractual obligations. This informality sometimes 
extended to the relationship between borrowers and creditors, the latter of whom 
could occasionally be invited to enter the partnership in an ad hoc debt-to-equity 
swap.79 The line between private and company use of the funds thus raised was 
likewise blurred. This  was especially so for sums raised as working capital, which 
could be instead directed towards the private consumption of partners, or their 
private investments and speculations. Although there could be recourse to the law  
when such cases became blatant, there were also occasions when nothing was done 
against such partners. For instance, neither Alexander Fordyce nor Sir George 
Colebrooke were ever prosecuted for speculating with their banks’ capital in 1772. 
When it came to more recognisably commercial credit, corporate bonds for 
larger companies already existed, though they required parliamentary approval 
before they were issued. East India bonds were a well established and popular 
instrument by this time,80 and the Ayr Bank’s liquidators also issued transferrable 
bearer bonds in the process of the company’s protracted unwinding. The sums 
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involved for these rare bond issues could be large: the bond issuance for the Ayr 
Bank was for £500,000. Conventional bank credit was more usual, though still far 
from ubiquitous. At the top of the banking system, the BOE was still very much a 
private company rather than the “central bank” it would become after 1844, but it 
was by no means a major agent of industrial and commercial investment. Since its 
foundation in 1694 the Bank had been primarily concerned with the financing of 
government, and by the middle of the Eighteenth Century was also increasingly 
concerned with the health of the financial system as a whole. Its private business 
consisted of some deposit taking for wealthy individuals and, especially, the 
discounting of bills of exchange for merchants in good standing. Discounting was by 
its very nature a short-termist operation, as bills of exchange never extended beyond 
three months in maturity. The Bank never lent money against illiquid long-term 
mortgage security, at least under normal conditions.81 
In Scotland there were three “public” (that is, chartered) banks located in 
Edinburgh. The Bank of Scotland (“the Old Bank”) had been established by Act of 
Scottish Parliament in 1695, while the Royal Bank of Scotland (“the New Bank”) was 
established by Royal Charter in 1727. They were later joined by the British Linen 
Bank, originally a company trading in textiles, which was chartered in 1746 and 
entered the business of banking in the 1750s.82 Though there were three of them, 
the Scottish public banks did not compare with the BOE either in size, resources, or 
monopoly privileges. The Bank of Scotland had in fact been explicitly barred from 
government finance through its very founding Act. 
The private banking partnerships that stood below the BOE were not uniform 
in their business model, but followed their own specialisation and comparative 
advantage. Goldsmith banks like the Childs, Hoares, Drummonds, and Martins, often 
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but not exclusively based in the West End of London, tended to serve the needs of 
the landed aristocracy and made a big point of their conservative manner of 
conducting business.83 “Merchant” London banks like Prescott Grote., Glyn & 
Hallifax, Sir George Colebrooke & Co., and NJFD, were usually based in the heart of 
the City and catered to a commercial clientele (Table 9).84 There were finally those 
with a foot in both camps like Barclays, originally a goldsmith bank that later 
expanded its business along commercial lines, and Goslings, whose physical location 
at Fleet Street corresponded to its hybrid nature halfway between the West End and 
City banks. Its customers included the gentry, local lawyers, publishers, and authors - 
Edward Gibbon had an account and a mortgage with them. More notably for the 
purposes of this discussion, Goslings had strong connections with the EIC dating all 
the way back to Diamond Pitt. Sir Francis Gosling was one of Clive’s financial agents, 
and some of the most prominent nabobs of this period were its customers. In 1762 a 
cousin of Lord Clive was admitted in the firm at the retirement of a previous 
partner.85  
The aggregate consumption of bank credit in this period is not easy to 
measure either directly, or through proxies like bankruptcies and other credit-
related litigation. When it comes to credit availability one can employ surviving 
balance sheets and profit and loss (henceforth: P&L) statements to obtain some 
impression of its trends. It must be stressed that the same reservations about the 
completeness and representative nature of the available primary data discussed in 
the previous chapter apply even more strongly to surviving financial evidence from 
this period. Records are sparse and do not simultaneously or continuously span the 
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period in question. Not all surviving accounts include both balance sheets and P&L 
statements for the same firm simultaneously, and not all necessary information 
required to construct comparable financial ratios is available for all firms. Therefore 
the various tables and graphs presented here will each be populated by different 
component firms, as surviving data allows. Analysis is further hampered from an 
absence of a common accounting standard. Although accounting manuals such as 
the Universal Accountant were available in this period,86 and most ledgers did follow 
the conventional double entry accounting standard, in practice private partnerships 
were under no obligation to publish their financial results in the manner of modern 
public corporations, and as such could follow any convention their partners 
preferred. This is especially evident when it comes to the terminology employed,  
which is not always comparable between contemporaneous firms, or even 
consistent for the same firm during different periods. The term “Sundries” in 
particular could mean different things from firm to firm, and from year to year, and 
could describe items either on the debit or credit side of the ledger, or indeed both 
simultaneously. Similarly, P&L accounting did not always make a clear distinction 
between gross and net revenue, or between net revenue and dividends paid out to 
partners. 
 Figure 9 presents the normalised asset growth for four banks whose accounts 
fully span the 1755-85 period.87 Figures for Coutts & Co. exclude cash reserves, as 
these have not survived. Coutts and Goslings were the most vigorously expanding of 
the four, showing asset growths of 500% and 300% respectively by the time of the 
1772 crisis. Figure 10 presents the same data in absolute terms (in fact in logarithmic 
scale, since Childs Bank dwarfed the rest in size), and adds the three Scottish 
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provincial banking co-partnerships that came into existence in the 1760s. These are 
the only seven firms whose surviving accounts overlap the 1772-3 crisis. This figure 
also confirms the rapid asset growth of Coutts and Goslings, which allowed them to 
reach (and in the case of Goslings, overtake) Barclays in the absolute magnitude of 
their assets. It also demonstrates how a mere four years after its inception the 
Aberdeen co-partnership, drawing upon its 197 partners, could rapidly approach the 
total asset level of long-established Barclays, which was restricted by the six partner 
rule. 
Table 10 summarises the growth rate trends of bank assets for the posited 
“Boom Decade” of 1762-71 and the war period that preceded it. This shows no 
apparent global trend of broad based credit expansion which would justify the 
formation of a bubble. Two firms (Barclays and the Perth Bank) only showed minimal 
asset growth. Childs expanded by almost 7% annually, while Coutts, Goslings and the 
Dundee Bank grew vigorously at about 12% per annum. For the four banks whose 
results completely span the period we can produce basic estimates of displacement 
in 1763. Once again the data present a diverse picture. Coutts showed no step-
change at all, but consistently grew its balance sheet at the same rapid rate. Barclays 
may have displayed a small jump in 1763, but it was nothing as dramatic as the 
acceleration of asset growth shown by Childs and Goslings. This is unsurprising when 
it comes to Goslings, considering its significant connections to the EIC and the Clive 
family. Its business appears to have benefited from the successful conclusion of the 
war in India and the award of the diwani to the EIC. Finally, Table 11 presents the 
balance sheet of the Ayr Bank at the time of its stop of payments. In a little over two 
years as a going concern this byword of Scottish credit excess had indeed grown a 
substantial asset base of over £1.2 million, making it almost 60% larger by assets 
than the largest English private bank, Childs.  
112 
 
These isolated figures can be then compared against a rough projection of 
the overall level of private banking assets for the whole country. This can be arrived 
at by multiplying the shareholder equity estimates derived in the previous section 
with an average leverage factor (total assets over shareholders’ equity). Unlike 
industry where ploughing-back of retained profits was probably the rule, surviving 
P&L data for banks shows a tendency to distribute the vast majority of their net 
profits as dividends to partners. As a result, shareholders’ funds remained broadly 
steady over a number of years, unless the partnership line-up was changed through 
death, retirement, or the admission of a new partner. Therefore, fluctuations in 
leverage can be assumed to be a good proxy for measuring corresponding 
fluctuations in banking assets. 
Table 12 presents such leverage factors for nine banks for whom figures 
survive over segments of the 1755-85 period. Only one of these, Barclays, 
completely spans this period. Three of the four Scottish co-partnerships established 
in the 1760s also supply continuous, though not fully spanning, data. The solitary 
figure for Goslings is an outlier that almost certainly overstates its leverage, since it 
arises from a date when the company was in the process of changing its partner and 
capital make-up. Similarly, the first three years just after the foundation of the 
Dundee Bank also appear to overstate the firm’s usual leverage and to be an artefact 
of the firm’s building up of its core business. 
A usual problem with financial data from this period is survivorship bias, with 
failed companies not represented as a rule, but for this case there is also some 
information for three of the stopped companies of 1772-3. There is a single data 
point for the Ayr Bank at the time of its stoppage on 24 June 1772 obtained directly 
by the balance sheets produced afterwards by the bank’s liquidators. The leverage 
factor for NJFD on the other hand is a very rough estimate. Although the firm’s 
bankruptcy commission documents have survived, they only concern themselves 
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with the liabilities of the company – no asset information has survived other than a 
snippet of its physical inventory valuation.88 Liabilities should of course by 
construction be mirrored by assets, balanced by the appropriate P&L. The problem 
for NJFD is that these P&L numbers are missing; we only have the firm’s start-up 
capital in 1763, but no further information on shareholders’ funds after that. Reports 
in the press about the size of Fordyce’s losses varied widely and cannot be used with 
any degree of confidence. Furthermore as shown in Table 13, even the liabilities are 
uncertain and contain a range of possibilities. As a result, the leverage of the 
company could have ranged from a very reasonable 9 to a decidedly risky 18, or even 
an outright dangerous (and very unlikely) 26. The time series for the third of the 
failed companies for whom data survive, the Anglo-Dutch firm of John Daniel & 
Maurice Dreyer, are also less than dependable. It is unclear whether the surviving 
ledgers for this firm are for the whole or for part of its business. This firm also 
appears to have had a substantial “off-balance sheet” business in trading 
accommodation bills with Dutch counterparties.89 For this reason, their apparent 
leverage factor as shown in Table 12 may be understated.   
With all this in mind, a leverage between 4 and 12 for mature banks seems to 
have been typical in the 1763-72 period, with 12 being the “peak boom” figure just 
before the crisis. Taking an average between 7 and 9 as representative of the English 
system in normal times, and multiplying that with the £1.75 - 2 million estimate for 
total bank equity postulated in the previous section, we can extrapolate a figure 
between £12.25 - 18 million for total private bank assets in England.90 Scotland’s 
banking system may have been as much as six times smaller, even after its significant 
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growth in the 1760s - as much as 11% per annum according to Cameron’s 
estimates.91 According to S. G. Checkland, Scottish banking assets came to a little 
over £3 million on the eve of the crisis.92 Taken against his estimate of around 
£500,000 in bank equity, this results to a leverage factor of 6 for the whole Scottish 
system, even including the outlier of the Ayr Bank (at 12), all of which is consistent 
with the leverage figures obtained directly for the three provincial banks presented 
in Table 12. In total, private banking assets for the whole of Britain can be 
extrapolated between £15.25 and 21 million.  
 Not all these assets consisted of loans to the public, but included investments 
in long-term securities (consols, bonds, and stocks), bills of exchange on London and 
elsewhere, and cash reserves. Cash-to-liability ratios, that is the fraction of banking 
assets held as cash, are the quintessential measure of fractional reserve banking. 
There survive a total of twelve sets of figures, six of them overlapping with the 1772-
3 crisis (Table 14 and Figure 11), which point to several discernible trends. Firstly, 
this ratio was very high by modern standards, occasionally exceeding 50% and even 
70% at the outbreak of the Seven Years War. Secondly, the ratio for English banks 
tended to substantially exceed that of the Scottish provincial co-partnerships. This 
cautious stance stands in contrast with the English banks’ apparently higher equity 
leverage, and might in fact imply an innate conservatism since balance sheets may 
still grow if banks take in more deposits but keep the cash in their tills. Thirdly, there 
is a strong correlation in the cash reserve policy behaviour of each firm with respect 
to their different customer bases. The old and conservative Childs aimed to keep a 
consistently high ratio, usually ranging between 30-50%, and seems to have made a 
conscious effort to increase it during times of political or financial distress. Prescotts 
and their affiliated country bank at Bristol kept a lower ratio of below 30% and 20% 
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115 
 
respectively. Goslings, the hybrid, fell somewhere in between. Finally, there is a long-
term declining trend over the course of the century, implying a gradually increasing 
risk appetite.93 For the 1760s we can assume that an average of one-third of assets 
in English banks, and of one-tenth in Scottish ones, were cash or near-cash.94 When 
used with the estimates from above of £15-21 million in total private banking assets, 
this results in a range between £11-15 million in non-cash assets for the whole of the 
British private banking system (Table 15).  
Though these aggregate calculations remain of course approximate, they can 
be helpful in putting some of the individual balance sheet numbers into perspective. 
The first observation that can be made under this light is that even at the higher end 
of these estimates this remained a very modest amount. As will be seen in the 
following section, the money stock of the whole country at this time has been 
estimated at roughly double this size: around £20-30 million, most of it in specie.95 
More importantly, public credit operated on a wholly different scale. The best 
example to illustrate this contrast is (as usual) the Ayr Bank. Its asset growth was 
certainly substantial when taken against the small Scottish banking system. Excluding 
bills on London, which were part of its money market financing operations and of 
which more will be said in the following section, about £825,000 of its assets 
consisted of long term loans and cash accounts. This represented as much as 30% of 
non-cash private bank assets in Scotland, a figure that climbs to almost 45% if the 
whole balance sheet, inclusive of London bills, is taken into account. For the whole of 
Britain, the Ayr Bank’s lending could have represented as much as 6-8% of non-cash 
private bank assets exclusive of bills of exchange, and as much as 8-11% inclusive of 
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them. This was doubtlessly a significant expansion of credit to have taken place in 
less than three years, even considering that the bank may have been backed by as 
much as a fifth of the total bank equity in Scotland. Taken against that, however, was 
the fact that the Ayr Bank was more than 25 times smaller than the BOE with its £31 
million of assets on the same date, of which only a tiny fraction were directed into 
private investment.96 Similarly, its accumulation of £825,000 in long term assets 
paled into insignificance when compared with the over £60 million rise in public debt  
during the Seven Years War, or of the latter’s absolute size at over £130 million in 
1772.97 In the light of such figures the Ayr Bank, though probably one of the largest 
private banks by assets in the whole of Britain, appears as one of the largest fish in a 
rather small private credit pond. 
In any event, the expansion of balance sheets does not necessarily imply a 
corresponding increase in credit risk. The high cash reserve fractions presented 
above already hint at a generally conservative rather than reckless banking system, 
and though these steadily declined over the second half of the century they did so 
gradually and in no way hinting at a credit mania. To make further judgement it 
would be necessary to investigate the distribution of non-cash assets, their maturity, 
the time for which they were held, their liquidity, and the security backing them. 
Sadly, the already sparse surviving balance sheet information becomes even sparser 
when it comes to detailed asset distribution. For all practical purposes only three of 
the banks discussed here, Childs, Goslings, and the Dundee Bank, have asset 
distribution records that overlap with the 1772-3 crisis, and even then they do not 
always contain sufficient detail; Childs’ ledgers for instance only have very broad 
subdivisions, and do not distinguish between loans and tradeable securities. Three 
                                                     
96
 BOE, Balance Sheets for February 1772 and 1773, ADM7/20, fos. 17-20. 
97
 Mitchell and Deane, Abstract, pp. 401-2. 
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more firms, Dimsdale, Archer and Byde, the Bristol Old Bank, and its London 
correspondent, Prescott, Grote & Co., have similar data but for a slightly later period. 
Depending on the business model of the specific bank in question, the 
distribution of assets could vary widely. A conservative goldsmith bank like Childs 
who made the repeated point in its customer correspondence that it never 
discounted bills of exchange,98 held a large proportion of its non-cash assets in the 
“Public Funds” – not just the ubiquitous Government debt, but also the stocks (and 
bonds where those existed) of the large joint-stock companies like the BOE and the 
EIC (Figure 12). A country bank like the one in Bristol on the other hand could hold 
substantial amounts in bills of exchange, both as a result of conventional discounting 
operations for local tradespeople, but also as part of its money market financing 
operations (Figure 13). Part of the Bristol Bank’s assets specifically consisted of an 
account with its London correspondent, who in turn handled the cash flows related 
to the maturity of the bank’s bills on London. This was a necessary alliance for a 
country bank in the absence of branch banking.99 The Bristol Bank’s correspondent 
was Prescott, Grote & Co., a relatively new City bank established in 1766. 
Unfortunately, this firm’s balance sheets have not survived before 1780, leaving only 
5 years for the interval under investigation here, and have therefore not been 
pictured. Instead, the distribution of assets for another firm, Dimsdale, Archer, and 
Byde, are shown as typical of such a corresponding London bank (Figure 14). 
Dimsdale in fact enter the 1772-3 narrative in another manner, having served as 
London correspondent for the Ayr Bank until 1771, after which they suspended that 
business relationship when becoming uneasy over the Scottish firm’s aggressive 
expansion.100 Over 60% of Dimsdale’s assets consisted of bills of exchange, making 
them and those other banks following the same business model a precursor of the 
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bill-brokers of the nineteenth century. Unfortunately, since none of these three 
firms have surviving balance sheets that extend back into the “booming” 1760s, it is 
not possible to determine whether they had embarked on a bills discounting mania 
as per the traditional 1772 crisis narrative. 
The best and most detailed time series that do overlap with the crisis are 
those for Goslings in London and the Dundee co-partnership in Scotland. Goslings, 
ever the hybrid, participated in all the business lines described above, shifting 
between them as the business environment changed (Figure 15). Their discounting 
operation was however very minor by comparison with conventional loans and 
mortgages. The firm’s major non-cash asset holdings in the pre-crisis decade instead 
consisted of public securities, especially East India bonds. This is consistent both with 
the bank’s connections with prominent nabobs, and with the EIC stock bubble of 
1766-9. Many, if not all, of these securities may have been purchased for the bank’s 
customers and do not necessarily reflect the bank’s own trading account. In any 
case, the bank and its customers rapidly reduced their East India bond positions after 
the bubble deflated in 1769, and indeed displayed an uncanny prescience in entirely 
exiting that business by the middle of 1772 when the EIC’s problems came to a head. 
Perhaps paradoxically, given the comparative backwardness of its economy, 
Scotland’s banks showed themselves to be particularly innovative in this period, and 
even seem to have enjoyed a competitive advantage over their English counterparts 
in supplying capital for some sectors of the economy like the colonial trades.101 The 
Royal Bank of Scotland and the Glasgow based Ship, Arms, and Thistle banks had all 
supported the North American tobacco trades from an early stage,102 and some of 
the Ayr Bank’s expansive lending was directed to firms with West Indian interests 
like William Alexander & Sons. Part of this capital was in the form of bills 
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acceptances, and another in conventional mortgages known in Scotland as heritable 
bonds. As can be seen in the distribution of assets for the Dundee co-partnership 
however (Figure 16) , by far the greatest proportion of credit consisted of the unique 
Scottish financial product of the cash account.103 This was a running line of credit, 
much like in a modern overdraft. Since interest was only payable on the amount 
actually disbursed at any moment, cash accounts were particularly suitable as 
working capital for businesses like long-distance commerce which had a built-in time 
lag between outlays and receipts. Unlike modern overdrafts, cash accounts were 
secured on the personal bond not only of the account holder but of two or more co-
obligants who stood as sureties for him. Although no maturity was specified in the 
contracts, ‘cash accounts were expected to have a rapid turnover… [as much as] four 
times a year’.104 Smith considered this property as a particularly valuable tool of 
credit risk discovery for lenders, since the pattern of drawings and repayments could 
supply indirect information on the viability of the underlying business.105 On the 
other hand he considered cash accounts as unsuitable for consumption, or such fixed 
term investments that did not lead to medium term profit generation by which the 
loan could be discharged, like land improvement. One of the traditional, but 
unsubstantiated, charges against the lending practices of the Ayr Bank was exactly 
that much of its largesse was directed towards the construction of the New Town of 
Edinburgh.106  
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Another Scottish innovation was branch banking. The Old Bank had briefly 
experimented with the concept in 1696-9 and 1731-3,107 but it was the much-
maligned Ayr Bank that was to embark upon it in earnest. In addition to establishing 
agencies in Glasgow, Inveray, Kelso, Montrose, and Campbeltown, the bank opened 
three full branches from the very first day of its operation, two of them in south-
west Scotland, in Ayr (the head office) and in Dumfries.  This large geographical 
catchment area might partly explain the bank’s very fast asset growth. Another 
reason, and one that was often repeated by contemporaries, was that the bank had 
moved into a credit vacuum. The centralisation of banking in Edinburgh, combined 
with a reluctance by the public banks to discount inland bills, had left large parts of 
the country chronically under-banked. South-west Scotland, where over half of the 
Ayr Bank’s partners were based, was only served by the two small private banks in 
Ayr and Dumfries whose operations appear to have been very limited and who were 
eventually taken over by the new firm in 1771.108 Furthermore, the Edinburgh 
banking establishment had actually curtailed lending after December 1768 in a 
response to the monetary fluctuations that beset the country all through the decade. 
The chartered banks had never been particularly liberal with their lending, but they 
now capped cash accounts to £1,000, and in May 1769 reduced this further to only 
£500. The discounting of inland bills and bills of exchange, never a major operation 
for them, was also completely suspended in July 1769.109 This widely perceived 
dearth of credit was a direct inspiration behind the establishment of the Ayr Bank, 
whose founding statement in November 1769 explicitly and prominently advanced 
the aim of a credit expansion that was commensurate to the needs of economic 
growth. Convinced that ‘the business of banking, when carried on proper principles, 
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is of great public utility, particularly to the commerce, manufactures, and agriculture 
of a country’, the bank’s founders even chose Pro Bono Publico as the bank’s 
motto.110 Even in 1774, after the project had collapsed so spectacularly, the author 
of the unsigned manuscript Case for Messrs Douglas Heron & Co. (henceforth: Case) 
felt that this reasoning remained essentially valid: 
The Chartered and other Banks in Scotland about the year 1768 and 
1769 withdrew their credits they had formerly allowed the country 
of Scotland within a very narrow compass, whereby the 
improvements in agriculture were in a great measure stopped and 
the manufacturers very much distressed. This encouraged many 
Noblemen and Gentlemen in Scotland to enter into articles of 
copartnery under the firm of Douglas Heron & Co. for issuing bank 
notes, giving out cash accounts to merchants, manufacturers and 
others, and for discounting inland bills.111 
This conviction that the bank’s motives were benign and its function useful for the 
country long survived the affair in some quarters.112   Even Smith, though approving 
of the Edinburgh banks’ credit policy and in general rejecting bank lending as a way 
to finance capital-intensive projects,113 admitted that it was only ‘in the midst of 
[much] clamour and distress, [that the Ayr Bank] was established… for the express 
purpose of relieving the distress of the country’.114 Far from embarking in a 
substantial credit expansion, the Ayr Bank’s lending may therefore have restored the 
overall credit situation back to its long-term trend. Checkland’s aggregate figures are 
not dense enough to show the evolution of the credit environment as a comparable 
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time series, but the possibility that credit expansion north of the Tweed was not 
excessive after all remains in the very least plausible. 
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Table 9. Distribution of claimants to the NJFD commission of bankruptcy, 1772 
Claimant profession  Claimants   Amount Claimed (£)  
Landowners and farmers  104   68,285  
Brokers and Bankers  22   86,376  
       Banker  8  72,563 
       Cashier of the BOE  1  1,915 
       Broker  10  10,730 
       Exchange Broker  1  1,025 
       Stock Broker  2  143 
Clergy and Urban Professionals  25   2,970  
Wholesale merchants and factors  121   59,674  
Retail and miscellaneous services  50   14,645  
Millers and bakers  5   1,755  
Brewers and distillers  21   6,404  
Textile Workers  45   10,447  
Other Artisans  65   15,187  
Widows and spinsters  19   6,472  
Not Specified/Ambiguous  26   12,082  
Grand Total  503   284,297  
Categorization by profession according to the author. Broker and Banker category is shown 
expanded. 





Figure 9. Normalised assets (1755=100) for three English private banks (total assets) and for Coutts Bank (long-term assets only). 




Figure 10. Total assets for three English private banks, Coutts Bank (long-term assets only), and three Scottish provincial co-
partnerships. Sources: Childs, Goslings, Barclays, Coutts: as per Figure 3.4. Aberdeen, Perth: Munn, Provincial banking companies, pp. 
242-3 & 277-9. Dundee: Boase, Century of banking, pp. 50-139. 
126 
 
Table 10. Bank balance sheet growth trends, 1762-71 and 1755-62  
 
"Boom decade" (1762-71) 
 




Total CAGR AAGR Std Dev  Total CAGR AAGR Std Dev  Δ(CAGR) 1762-3 
Childs 79.7% 6.7% 7.2% 11.2%  -17% -2.6% -2% 15%  9.3% 26% 
Goslings 168.0% 11.6% 13.1% 20.2%  10% 1.4% 3% 19%  10.2% 51% 
Barclays 9.1% 1.0% 2.1% 16.0%  -15% -2.3% -1% 20%  3.3% 11% 





52.5% 11.1% 14.4% 32.3%         
Dundee
 (c)
 61.4% 12.7% 7.3% 16.5%         
Perth
 (d)












Table 11. Ayr Bank balance sheet at the time of its stop of payments, 22 June 1772 
Liabilities   Assets   
     
Deposits 300,000   Cash & Fixed Capital  2,000 
b
  
Banknotes in the circle 
a 
224,000   Debts at main branches 694,175  
Drafts on London correspondents  600,000   (of which self-dealing 400,000) 
Paid-up capital 104,413   Debts at agencies 133,788  
"Profit" put in to make up balance 10,630   Bills on London 409,079  
   (of which dishonoured 180,000) 
     
 1,239,043    1,239,043  
Amounts in pounds sterling. Author’s estimated figures in italics
 
a 
1773 estimates (NAS GD224/178/2/22). The Precipitation (written in 1778) rounds this down to 
£220,000 
b
 Checkland, Scottish Banking, 237. This figure is unattributed to a primary source, and is almost 
certainly an underestimate. 




Table 12. Bank asset leverage factors (total assets/shareholders’ equity), 1755-85  
 
Barclays Goslings Curries Bristol NJFD Ayr Dundee Aberdeen Perth Dreyer 
1755 16 
 
   
  
  2 
1756 13 
 
   
  
  1 
1757 12 
 
   
  
  1 
1758 11 
 
   
  
  1 
1759 9 
 
   
  
  1 
1760 10 
 
   
  
  1 
1761 8 
 
   
  
  2 
1762 8 
 
   
  
  2 
1763 9 
 
   
  
  2 
1764 8 
 
   
 
25   2 
1765 8 
 
   
 
28   2 
1766 8 
 
   
 
11   2 
1767 7 
 
   
 
8  8 2 
1768 6 
 
   
 
8 4 7 3 
1769 7 
 
   
 
7 4 6 3 
1770 12 
 
   
 
7 3 5 2 
1771 12 
 
   
 





12 7 3 4 failed 
1773 8 28
 (b) 
 9 failed failed 5 4 4 
 1774 9 
 
4 10  
 
5 4 3 
 1775 8 
 
5 11  
 
6 4 4 
 1776 7 
 
4 15  
 
7 5 5 
 1777 7 
 
5 16  
 
7 5 5 
 1778 7 
 
6 14  
 
7 5 5 
 1779 11 
 
5 16  
 
6 4 5 
 1780 10 
 
8 10  
 
6 4 5 
 1781 11 
 
 11  
 
8 5 5 
 1782 10 
 
 12  
 
7 5 5 
 1783 11 
 
 13  
 
7 5 5 
 1784 9 
 
 14  
 
6 5 6 
 1785 11 
 
 12  
 
7 5 6 
 
   















Sources (left to right): BGA 130/729-724, BGA 364/1-40 & 78-84, RBS CU/118, RBS MCB/1/1-2, same as 
Table 3.7, RBS CH/206/1-3, same as Table 3.5, Boase, Century of Banking, pp. 50-139, Munn, Provincial 
banking companies, pp. 242-3, ibid., pp. 277-9, BGA 392/72. 
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Debts proved to Commission, 21/6/1794 181,879 11 
Debts proved to Commission, 23/12/1772  146,402 9 
Total claims to Commission, 1772 284,297 18 
Total claims, inclusive of petitions to Lord Chancellor 411,000 26 
   




Table 14. Bank cash-to-liabilities ratios, 1755-85. Possible crisis responses marked in bold.  
 
Childs Barclays Goslings Drummonds Curries Dimsdale Prescott Bristol Ayr Aberdeen Dundee Perth 
1755 35% 50% 34%          
1756 41% 72% 47%          
1757 68% 62% 43%          
1758 30% 45% 30%          
1759 41% 49% 35%          
1760 32% 47% 46%          
1761 35% 50% 40%          
1762 29% 53% 37%      
 
   
1763 26% 52% 43%          
1764 29% 58% 31%        11%  
1765 23% 51% 34%        11%  
1766 26% 46% 36%        12%  
1767 27% 48% 30%        24% 11% 
1768 25% 23% 24%       36% 11% 12% 
1769 28% 22% 30%       42% 11% 12% 
1770 32% 17% 35%       33% 6% 6% 
1771 29% 26% 29%       13% 8% 27% 
1772 35% 46% 20%      0.16% 
(a) 
12% 43% 19% 
1773 39% 32% 29%     18%  12% 17% 22% 
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1774 44% 35% 25%     14%  14% 20% 10% 
1775 37% 31% 24%     15%  15% 18% 8% 
1776 37% 28% 22%     17%  11% 26% 6% 
1777 31% 29% 17% 39% 14% 14%  18%  6% 28% 9% 
1778 45% 35% 27% 66% 31% 30%  20%  6% 25% 15% 
1779 53% 41% 45% 64% 22% 23%  16%  11% 32% 10% 
1780 40% 23% 30% 52% 19% 26% 31% 15%  4% 33% 9% 
1781 41% 34% 37% 42%  19% 25% 12%  3% 22% 13% 
1782 51% 31% 28% 45%  19% 31% 23%  3% 23% 12% 
1783 38% 32% 16% 29%  12% 25% 13%  2% 21% 10% 
1784 33% 41% 27% 23%  20% 26% 14%  3% 23% 15% 
1785 53% 38% 17% 17%  21% 24% 17%  5% 13% 7% 
Average 
(1763-72) 
27% 32% 38%      
 
31% 12% 13% 





 Figure 11. Cash-to-liabilities ratio for six British private banks. Sources: as per Figure Table 14. 
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Table 15. Size estimates of the British private banking system in the 1760s and 1770s 
  
 Number of banks  
 Average partners' equity, London private banks   15,000 - 20,000                                          50  
 Average partners' equity, English country banks                                       10,000                                        100 
 
Total private bank equity commitment, England   1,750,000 - 2,000,000  
  Total private bank equity commitment, Scotland                                     500,000  
  
Average asset leverage, England   7-9  
  Average asset leverage, Scotland                                                  6  
  
Total private banking assets, England   12,250,000 - 18,000,000  
  Total private banking assets, Scotland                                 3,000,000  
  Total private banking assets, Britain   15,250,000 - 21,000,000  
  
Non-cash asset fraction, England   2/3  
  Non-cash asset fraction, Scotland   9/10  
  
Non-cash private banking assets, England   8,200,000 - 12,000,000  
  Non-cash private banking assets, Scotland                                 2,700,000  
  Non-cash private banking assets, Britain   11,000,000 - 15,000,000  
  
  
 % of Scottish system   % of British system  
Ayr Bank, total assets                                 1,250,000  45% 8-11% 
Ayr Bank, long-term assets                                     825,000  30% 6-8% 
All amounts in pounds sterling. All figures and results of calculations approximate. Figures do not necessarily follow from direct 




Figure 12. Annual distribution of assets for Childs Bank, London. A small miscellaneous subdivision of “Sundries” at around 2.5% of 
total assets between 1763-68 is unlabelled at the top the graph. The vertical lines mark potential displacement or crisis events: (a) 




Figure 13. Annual distribution of assets for Bristol Old Bank. The vertical lines mark potential displacement or crisis events: Breakout or 




Figure 14. Annual distribution of assets for Dimsdale, Archer, and Byde, London. The vertical lines mark potential displacement or crisis 




Figure 15. Annual distribution of assets for Goslings Bank, London (semi-annual data points). The vertical lines mark potential 




Figure 16. Annual distribution of assets for Dundee Bank. The vertical lines mark potential displacement or crisis events: (a) Breakout or end of 
European war (dotted); (b) 1772-3 credit crisis (solid). Source: see Table 14. 
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The payment system: bills of exchange and paper money  
The asset side of any balance sheet inevitably tells only half the story. Even the 
strongest group of assets can be undone if arrangements for funding them are 
constructed imprudently or fall apart after an external shock. We have already 
briefly looked at the liability side as a whole when discussing shareholders’ equity 
and cash-to-liability ratios. It is however two groups of liabilities which have been 
identified above all others as embodying the weaknesses and excesses of the 
payment system of the 1760s: bills of exchange, and paper money issuance. 
We have already referred to bills of exchange in passim, and in the end of the 
previous section described how they formed a substantial proportion of some banks’ 
assets. It is now time to introduce them more formally and expand on their role as 
liabilities. Like so many other financial instruments and concepts, bills of exchange 
were a late medieval Italian development that had grown increasingly common in 
British finance after the Financial Revolution of the turn of the eighteenth century. 
By the 1760s they were so well established that manuals like the Universal 
Accountant dedicated a major part to them. Its definition remains as concise and 
accurate as any other: 
A Bill of exchange is, a short order for money to be received in one 
place or country, for the value paid in another; in which there are 
generally four persons concerned; two at the place where it is 
drawn, and two at the place of payment; viz. the drawer, or he who 
gives the order to make payment; the indorser, or he to whose 
order the bill is made payable, and remits it to his correspondent, 
with an indorsation or transference of property; the porteur or 
remitee, to whom the bill is remitted for acceptance and payment; 
and the accepter, upon whom the order is made, and by his 
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acceptance binds himself to the payment of the debt, or 
observance of the order.115 
For the modern reader who is unfamiliar with the instrument, the closest equivalent 
to a bill of exchange is a post-dated cheque.116 The “drawer” is the same in both 
cases, being the person who gives the order of payment. The same holds for the 
“payee” or “indorser”, being the person named as the recipient of the funds. The 
differences are that, whereas a modern cheque is drawn on a bank in which the  
drawer keeps an account, and the bank’s liability runs only to the extent that this 
account has sufficient funds in it to clear the cheque, a bill of exchange was 
“accepted” by a physical person. That person could be a banker, but this was not 
necessary. Another major difference was that from the moment someone accepted 
the bill he became fully liable for its full principal amount. Furthermore, if before 
maturity the original payee had “endorsed” the cheque to a further recipient for 
payment of his own debts, then the endorser too became fully liable for the principal 
as much as the drawer and acceptor. 
Bills had three primary functions. The original one had been to effect 
payments related to trade transactions featuring a time lag between agreement and 
delivery, or where the counterparties were separated by long distances. Very often 
bills incorporated a foreign exchange transaction as well. By 1772 the bill drawn on 
London or Amsterdam bankers (and, increasingly, on aggressive Scottish newcomers 
like the Ayr Bank) was the long-established cornerstone of international trade, 
allowing the fast and safe transfer of funds without the risk and expense of 
transporting specie, even had specie been abundantly available.117 “Inland” bills in 
the same currency had also become increasingly common since the Seventeenth 
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Century, and were a direct pointer to the growing monetization and financialization 
of British commerce.118 Safety and convenience aside, one of their greatest 
advantages was flexibility. In practice, the four contracting parties were often 
reduced to three or even just two (the drawer and acceptor being always necessary), 
as it was not unknown for a drawer to make a bill payable to himself thus turning it 
in some measure into a bearer instrument. As already intimated above, bills were 
also transferable through serial endorsement: the beneficiary (“indorser” according 
to the definition above, sometimes also known as the “payee”) could himself 
endorse a bill to a new beneficiary before it matured - and he in turn to another.  
All this made bills more fungible, a quality that was recognised in practice by 
those London banks like Dimsdale or Prescott who discounted large quantities of 
them daily. This in turn gave rise to their second major function, that of constructing 
money market loans in the absence of a modern style interbank market.119 
According to so-called “acceptance” loan transactions, borrowers paid commissions 
to their local bankers for them to draw “accommodation” bills accepted by the 
latter’s London (or Amsterdam) correspondents, in effect renting the established 
credit of internationally connected banks. The bills thus drawn were subsequently 
sold on at a discount to other investors who at maturity would present them to the 
international banker for repayment of their par value (Figure 17).120 Alternatively, 
they could be rediscounted at a bank, with the BOE being the ultimate discounting 
power in the country through sheer size of capital resources.  
The third function of bills was to act as a surrogate paper currency. The 
formal monetary system of the country was founded on a de jure silver standard, 
with the pound sterling as the universal unit of account. In practice however, the 
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gold guinea was far more prevalent as the practical medium of exchange, though the 
establishment of a formal gold standard would have to wait for another half century. 
More important than this bimetallism however, was the widespread contemporary 
conviction that there was never enough specie of either sort to serve the needs of an 
expanding economy. This deficiency became particularly acute when it came to small 
denomination coins which were virtually non-existent.121 In addition, there was a 
steady specie drain all through this period, running North to South from Scotland to 
London and thence to Amsterdam. This was partly due to the wartime commitments 
of the British government, who had to pay for its foreign subsidies and troops in 
specie, but also by the fluctuations in the supply and demand of metallic money in 
the main commercial centres of the continent. The official data (which are almost 
certainly an underestimate of the true level of this trade, since specie was easily and 
widely smuggled) show that an average of £1.2 million a year was exported during 
the Seven Years War (Figure 18). Even during the peaceful interval that followed, the 
drain continued at an average of over £700,000 per year. Modern estimates for the 
coin stock of England range from £15-18 million in 1750 to £20-44 million around the 
turn of the nineteenth century. Around the time of the crisis the specie in circulation 
may have been around £16-27 million.122 
To compensate for these deficiencies, a number of monetary substitutes 
were pressed into use, including foreign coins, counterfeit coins, and privately issued 
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token money, as well as a wide variety of payments in kind.123 Above all, there was a 
constant seeking after paper monetary surrogates. Banknotes were the obvious 
substitute, but even with the growth of note-issuing country banks the amounts 
issued were still a minority of the total money supply of the country. 
Notwithstanding ubiquitous contemporary English complaints about the “Deluge of 
Scotch Paper Currency”,124 the BOE’s own note issue remained the largest 
component of paper money outstanding and remained broadly constant throughout 
the 1760s around the £5-6 million mark (Figure 19). Perhaps another million 
comprised the sum of the private bank issues in England,125 while Scotland’s 
supposed flood of paper amounted to a mere £864,000 with the Ayr Bank 
contributing £224,000.126 The Scottish component was perhaps disproportionate for 
what was still a small and poor country, while its increase of almost a third in the 
three short years of the Ayr Bank’s life was certainly dramatic in relative terms. Set 
against this however, are the recurring and persistent voices (even after the crisis) 
that Scotland’s monetary base had been unacceptably narrow for its growing 
economy. Above all, it should be remembered that none of these Scottish paper 
issues circulated south of the Tweed, much less in London where all the press 
complaints about them originated. 
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No banknotes, whatever their origin, circulated widely enough in any event; 
even BOE notes became increasingly scarce only a few tens of miles outside London. 
Country bank notes were even less prevalent, and also suffered from lack of 
universal acceptability. On the other hand, bills of exchange accepted by a reputable 
bank in a major financial centre like London or Amsterdam were in some ways as 
good, or better, quality money as many country bank notes. The main problem with 
using bills in a monetary capacity, however, was that unlike specie or conventional 
banknotes bills had a built-in maturity date, and a short one at that: “long-dated” 
bills were usually drawn for three months after date at most. This obstacle was 
circumvented through the notorious practice of “swivelling”, or the drawing of new 
bills as “payment” for maturing ones. According to Smith’s oft-quoted description:  
The trader A in Edinburgh… draws a bill upon B in London, payable 
two months after date. In reality B in London owes nothing to A in 
Edinburgh; but he agrees to accept of A's bill, upon condition that 
before the term of payment he shall redraw upon A in Edinburgh, 
for the same sum, together with the interest and a commission, 
another bill, payable likewise two months after date. B accordingly, 
before the expiration of the first two months, redraws this bill upon 
A in Edinburgh; who again, before the expiration of the second two 
months, draws a second bill upon B in London, payable likewise two 
months after date; and before the expiration of the third two 
months, B in London redraws upon A in Edinburgh another bill, 
payable also two months after date... This practice [had] sometimes 
gone on, not only for several months, but for several years 
together, the bill always returning upon A in Edinburgh, with the 
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accumulated interest and commission of all the former bills… This 
practice was called raising money by circulation.127  
This artificial extension of the bills’ maturity finally gave them all the characteristics 
of a surrogate paper currency money. It is not obvious, however, whether the chief 
motivation behind swivelling was the desire to supplement a meagre monetary base 
with additional inside money, or a wish to extend short-term accommodation loans 
so as to finance asset growth. The accumulation of bills on London as assets served 
both purposes, especially in Scotland.128 Scottish banks were well advanced in the 
practice of issuing conventional banknotes, which were by construction perpetual, 
fungible, and payable to bearer, and hence superior as liabilities compared to 
drawing bills. On the other hand, banknotes were theoretically convertible on 
demand, unlike bills with their fixed maturities. Considering the narrow metallic 
monetary base of the country this made note issues precarious, as any sudden and 
vigorous demand for specie against them could not be practically backed by the 
limited quantities of metallic money in circulation. The danger of sudden 
presentation of a large amount of their banknotes was an ever present threat for 
Scottish banks. The establishment of a note exchange system,  through which banks 
netted out each other’s notes as they came into their possession, somewhat 
diminished this danger and helped bring an end to the frequent “note wars” that had 
raged between them in the past.129 Furthermore, an “Optional Clause” had been 
introduced in the early 1760s, by which banks could elect to defer payment of specie 
on presentation of their notes in exchange for paying 5% interest for six months. The 
Optional Clause was highly controversial, however, and was finally banned in 1765 
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by Parliament. 130 By the time of the establishment of the Ayr Bank four years later, 
the problem of insufficient reserve money to maintain the various banknote issues 
remained as acute as ever. Bills on London could partly fill that gap, and the resulting 
high demand for them made them very expensive. The “adverse exchange” with 
London was an ongoing problem in Scotland throughout this period,131 and may well 
have added to the urgency through which Ayr Bank issued ever more of its 
banknotes in an attempt to buy up more of these liquid and widely accepted 
instruments. The same was even more the case in the American colonies, where the 
structural deficits of the tobacco trade, together with the fact that American paper 
money issues in all their great variety and (all too often) inflationary disrepute were 
not readily accepted by British merchants, drove the exchange for London bills there 
as high as 25-33% in premium.132 The situation deteriorated after the BOE reportedly 
became reluctant to discount Scottish bills. According to the Inquiry,133 this latter 
restriction had been directly behind the growth of correspondent banking with 
London, as the Bank was more amenable to discounting paper accepted by London 
bankers rather than Scottish merchants. 
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The potential dangers inherent in swivelling and the unchecked use of 
accommodation bills were manifold. One was that costs could become heavy for 
habitual users. Bankers in major financial centres were happy to oblige requests for 
swivelling since commission income could be lucrative. Smith’s back-of-the-envelope 
calculation for the Ayr Bank was for six such operations annually at an average 
commission of 0.5% each, leading to an aggregate cost of 3%. Estimates by the Ayr 
Bank’s liquidators later put this overhead as high as 7% per annum on top of the 5% 
legal interest at the peak of the credit crisis in early 1773, after the bank had already 
temporarily stopped payment.134 On top of the usual maximum of 5% interest 
mandated by the usury laws, this implied that the bank was paying as much as eight 
to twelve per cent per annum for its money-market loans.135  
More seriously, such practices could dramatically expand balance sheets at a 
stroke of the pen. This was already the case when merely extending the bills’ 
maturity as described above, but often the bills exactly mirrored each other in both 
terms and amounts, with one counterparty accepting the other (or its confederates). 
This served to provide the counterparties with additional liquid (and potentially, 
discountable for hard cash) instruments. A typical swivelling arrangement involving 
several failed firms of June 1772 can be seen in Table 16.136 John Fordyce’s 
Edinburgh-based Fordyce, Malcolm & Co. and Arbuthnot & Guthrie, an Edinburgh 
private bank with notable connections to the British Linen Company, drew for the 
benefit of each other bills with exactly matching payable amounts and maturity 
dates. The accepting banks in London were either Fordyce’s London partnership, 
Fordyce, Grant, & Co., or Charles Ferguson & Co., another London-based Scottish 
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firm which failed at the outset of the crisis. Leaving aside for the moment the credit 
risk implications,137 the absence of formal limits on the total amount of outstanding 
bills in the financial system potentially made this an inflationary practice. This was 
recognised at the time, particularly when it came to “fictitious bills, i.e. fiat financial 
instruments that did not correspond to real underlying commercial transactions.  
Although this was not an innovation particular to this period but long established 
practice, contemporary crisis sources were quick to assert that the practice had 
exceeded previous experience by 1772, especially when Scottish firms were 
concerned. The Real Bills Doctrine, that is the prescription to any bank (with the BOE 
above all others) to only discount bills that corresponded to real transactions, was 
later proposed exactly as an internal market mechanism to prevent the expansion of 
balance sheets beyond the levels prescribed by real commercial activity. The bills 
employed in the colonial and other import-export trades in which Scotland was so 
prominent were very much “real”, however, and were generated by a voluminous 
trade in real commodities. Indeed, the very fact that expanding foreign trade created 
so many real bills which could be also used as a monetary instrument may have even 
fed the financial boom, by providing increased quantities of the very instrument that 
was its signature.  
 Above all, bills finance could result in a vicious circle of banknote and bills 
issuance for those Scottish banks using the London bills market as inside money to 
refinance their assets and back their outstanding banknote issues. This led them to 
issue even more banknotes to buy up any available London bills, or to draw their 
own bills of exchange as payment for them in swivelling transactions. In turn, both 
banknotes and newly drawn bills required liquid assets to back them, leading back to 
the need to buy up even more London bills (Figure 20). The Ayr Bank became the 
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most notorious exponent of the practice, resulting in its accumulating in just two and 
a half years a full third of its assets and almost half of its liabilities in London bills of 
exchange (Table 17).   
All these risks could prove catastrophic for individual firms that overindulged in 
the practice, especially if the London money markets were ever to shut off, denying 
them the ability to refinance their balance sheets. As we shall see in Chapter 4, this is 
exactly the mechanism which drove the Ayr Bank to suspend payments in June 1772. 
But was such overuse (or abuse) of bills of exchange so prevalent as to endanger the 
financial system more generally, as contemporaries alleged? More specifically: 
1. Was the bills of exchange market a big part of the monetary system as a 
whole? 
2. Is there any concrete evidence that this market grew excessively in the 
1760s? 
3. Could the positive feedback loop described above truly go on unchecked? 
The overall amount of bills of exchange that functioned as monetary instruments has 
been estimated only in the vaguest terms, and remains the object of widely differing 
views. Cameron has echoed the crisis’ own contemporaries in asserting that bills 
made up the bulk of the money supply, i.e. potentially up to £20-25 million according 
to his rough estimates of the latter. Forrest Capie has strongly rejected this, 
estimating at most ‘£7 million of inside money’ circulating in the middle of the 
Eighteenth Century, and concludes that as some of this was ‘undoubtedly bank 
deposits… only a small fraction of the total money stock [was] made up of bills’. 
Capie’s estimates, though plausible, are backed up only by a single contemporary 
reference, that of David Hume who ‘spoke of a money stock of £30 million in 
1750’.138 As Capie’s calculations of the money base (specie plus banknotes) on that 
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date come to only £23 million, this results in the figure for inside money just quoted. 
The latest estimates by Nuno Palma accept Capie’s methodology for bills of 
exchange; together with his figures for coin in circulation and the ones for paper 
money given earlier, he has arrived to a broad money (M2) estimate for England of 
£42.5 million in 1772, and a composite broad money one (M3/M4) of £46.5 
million.139  
The BOE’s discount facility can help resolve this debate, as well as answer the 
three questions posed above. Notwithstanding Smith’s claims that swivelling could 
have continued for years on end, and the undoubted fact that there was no legal bar 
to limit the amount of bills that could be drawn and accepted in the money markets, 
the underlying availability of cash ultimately served to put a limit to both practices. 
Smith focused on real bills as they involved (metallic) cash flows generated by real 
trade, and even went to the extent of putting BOE notes on an equal footing with 
those of private banks. In truth, however, the BOE stood on a wholly different plane 
through the sheer amount of resources available to it. Its discount facility was the 
biggest source of cash (both metallic and paper) for the money markets, and so long 
as this remained under control any excessive issuance of bills, real or fictitious, 
would be starved through lack of access to this ultimate source of hard money. Thus, 
the fluctuations in the Bank’s discount volumes can serve as a proxy of the quantity 
of inside money available to swivelling counterparties. End-of-year levels for the 
total amount of bills under discount can be directly obtained from the Bank’s 
balance sheets (Figure 21). Starting from very low levels up to 1760, this amount 
rapidly increased to a level around £2-3 million which it then maintained throughout 
the following decade. This is a level much closer to Capie’s estimates, but we cannot 
go into much more detail than this. Though complete, the daily discount returns only 
list aggregate totals that include interest, and though we know the discount rate the 
                                                     
139
 As Footnote 122 above. 
151 
 
Bank used (5% per annum for inland bills, 4.5% per annum for foreign bills),140 we 
know neither the distribution of maturities of the paper it accepted, nor what 
proportion of the total bills circulating in London this represented. One might 
assume that the Bank preferred to discount paper with as few days left in it as 
possible as to minimise its credit exposure to its signatories (usually the bill acceptor, 
since this was often a London private bank). On the other hand, the desire to earn 
discount interest must have limited this risk aversion. A hint at the level where these 
tendencies cleared each other can be gleaned from a private letter by  the Ayr Bank’s 
liquidator, George Home, who during the 1773 Amsterdam phase of the crisis 
mentioned that the Bank ‘threw out an acceptance of Sir George Colebrooke which 
had only 30 days to run’ as something entirely out of the ordinary.141 A residual 
would in any case be thrown out always, whether out of poor creditworthiness of 
the signatories or according to the Bank’s (also unknown) cash flow budgeting. The 
converse held for users of the discount facility: normally they would prefer to 
discount their bills as early as possible so as to minimise their credit exposure to the 
bill acceptor; on the other hand, too early a presentation would involve a higher cost 
as the discount interest would run for a longer period. There would also be a residual 
amount of paper never presented to the Bank but left to mature on its own. These 
preference functions would clear at some unknown level, perhaps the two months 
repeatedly mentioned by Smith in his famous description of swivelling. Detailed 
information from earlier in the century seems to confirm this tendency for 
discounted paper to range between 40 and 70 calendar days (Figure 22).142  
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The Ayr Bank occupied an especially prominent position in this comparatively 
small world, with its asset and liability interests together involving perhaps one-fifth 
of the discountable bills market at the time of its stoppage (Table 17). This made the 
bank’s individual position precarious, but it is unlikely its experience was repeated 
elsewhere. Rather than hint at a bills of exchange boom, the evidence from the 
BOE’s discounts rather displays a stable picture throughout the period, with the 
exception of a number of temporary spikes in its activity that coincided with periods 
of political or financial distress. We will return to the latter in Chapter 4.  
Did finance “fan the flames”? 
There is little doubt that the growth of financial intermediation was substantial in 
this period, broadly keeping pace with the steady though unspectacular growth of 
the overall economy. Whether this growth was strong enough to cause an 
endogenous asset, credit, or inflationary bubble, or to merely “fan the flames” of an 
initial economic displacement, is far less certain. Though the surviving data is 
extremely sparse, it appears that equity growth was mainly fuelled by retained 
earnings which is not in itself a mechanism conducive to bubble growth. Credit 
growth also followed broad economic growth trends, and was if anything reversed in 
Scotland after 1768 by the conscious decision of the chartered banks to retrench 
their lending activity. .143 The establishment of the Ayr Bank was intended to provide 
a release in the pent-up demand for credit caused by this policy, and even its rapid 
credit growth in 1770 and 1771 may have represented at most a 10% increment of 
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the nominal term were longer, the value of the bills as monetary instruments only extended to the 
degree that they could be discountable by the ultimate source of hard cash in the country, i.e. the 
BOE.  
143
 NAS, Buccleuch papers, GD224/178/9. This document’s context makes it likely that it was authored 
by George Home. 
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the private banking credit of the United Kingdom, which in turn was only a modest 
proportion of the available credit mechanisms in the country.   
The traditional charge of monetary fallacy is more plausible, but still not 
sufficient in itself to justify the destabilization of the financial system. The 
unregulated circulation of paper money from private banks, especially in Scotland, 
may have been identified almost immediately as the likeliest culprit of the crisis, .144 
but the figures do not support contemporary concerns. The mild inflation which 
perhaps prevailed between the Seven Years and American wars was wholly in line 
with what economic growth took place, and in any event could be better attributed 
to the fluctuations in agricultural production, still the overwhelming majority of 
overall economic activity.145 Moreover, the expansion of banknote circulation was in 
fact not substantial: the BOE’s note issue remained broadly stable, and considering 
that it dwarfed all private bank issues (including the supposedly extravagant Scottish 
ones) by as much as three to one, it is doubtful that any excess from that quarter 
would have made much of a difference. Even the Ayr Bank’s supposed “deluge of 
paper currency” that the hostile London press dwelt on so much during the 
immediate aftermath of the 1772 crisis may have comprised as small a proportion of 
the overall paper money issue of the country as 2.5%. 
When it comes to bills of exchange, contemporary accusations of imprudence 
and excess seem more convincing in the light of surviving evidence.   The total 
amount of bills outstanding in the system was probably not all that excessive, 
considering that the BOE discount facility may have accommodated at any time 
around £2-3 million at most out of perhaps £7 million in inside money. This was but a 
modest proportion of the total monetary base of the country, which in turn was 
considered almost universally as totally inadequate for the needs of an expanding 
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 Inquiry on the late mercantile distresses, pp. 6-8. 
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 Ashton, Fluctuations, p. 36. 
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economy. Theoretically of course bills could be swivelled forever, and their 
outstanding notional amounts could accordingly become astronomical. In practice 
however, the BOE’s discount activity served to put a very real limit on issuance, since 
the inability to have a bill discounted by the Bank almost instantaneously destroyed 
its creditworthiness and value as a financial instrument. There were in fact 
numerous apocryphal reports in 1772 that the crisis had been precipitated by the 
Bank’s sudden refusal to discount Scottish and Dutch Jewish bills, after it became 
concerned at the supposed monetary bubble.146 These rumours are entirely 
unsubstantiated by the minutes of the Bank’s Court of Directors, where there is not a 
single mention of a change in discount attitude throughout the pre-crisis period.147 
On the other hand, the multiple liability regime inherent in bills of exchange, by 
which every drawer, acceptor, and endorser could be held liable for its whole 
principal, meant that there was not a one-to-one correspondence between bill 
notional amounts and their credit risk. The more signatories there were, the more 
the potential risk multiplied; and the more bills were used as a surrogate currency, 
the more these signatories proliferated. It is therefore bills of exchange chains, 
rather than swivelling, that are the most plausible cause for the destabilization of the 
financial system presented so far.  
It should be stressed, however, that not all these bills of exchange were 
fictitious, or of poor credit. The rapidity with which the BOE expanded discounts 
every time there was a crisis, and the relative lack of evidence for heavy losses 
incurred by this activity,148 not only shows its readiness to assume a de facto LOLR 
role, but also that it considered these bills to be fundamentally of sound credit. The 
issue of the asset quality is however part of a different discussion that concerns asset 
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 The earliest instance of this oft-repeated, but entirely unsupported, rumour can be found in 
General Evening Post, 20-23 June, 1772. Middlesex Journal, 3-5 September 1772, has a more 
elaborate version, though equally unsubstantiated. 
147
 As will be discussed in Chapter 4, the first policy change only took place a year after the crisis. 
148
 Clapham, Bank of England, I, pp. 301-2. See Chapter 4 for a longer discussion on this 
155 
 
speculation, speculative projects, and the corruption of insiders, and will be the 






Figure 17. Outline of an international acceptance loan at inception and maturity. The interest payable to the investor is reflected in the discounted 




Figure 18. British official exports of specie, 1755-85. The averages for the Seven Years War and pre-1772 peacetime years are marked. 




Figure 19. Bank of England end of year note issuance and bullion reserves, 1755-85. Amounts in thousands of pounds sterling. Figures 
up to 1764 are as of end of August, from 1766 onwards as of end of February. 1765 is therefore not represented as the accounting goes 
straight from August 1764 to February 1766. The figures for 1774 are entirely missing due to the gold coin recoinage of that year. 
Source, Clapham, Bank Of England, pp. 296-7. 
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1  300 13-Apr 55 Arbuthnot & Guthrie  Fordyce & Grant  Fordyce & Malcolm 
2  750 13-Apr 60 Arbuthnot & Guthrie  Fordyce & Grant  Fordyce & Malcolm 
3  500 13-Apr 65 Arbuthnot & Guthrie  Fordyce & Grant  Fordyce & Malcolm 
19  350 18-Apr 55 Fordyce & Malcolm  Charles Ferguson & Co  Arbuthnot & Guthrie  
20  300 18-Apr 60 Fordyce & Malcolm  Charles Ferguson & Co  Arbuthnot & Guthrie  
21  400 18-Apr 55 Fordyce & Malcolm  Fordyce & Grant  Arbuthnot & Guthrie  
22  300 18-Apr 50 Fordyce & Malcolm  Fordyce & Grant  Arbuthnot & Guthrie  
23  200 18-Apr 60 Fordyce & Malcolm  Fordyce & Grant  Arbuthnot & Guthrie  
Total Fordyce & Malcolm on Arbuthnot & Guthrie £1,550 
Total Arbuthnot & Guthrie on Fordyce & Malcolm £1,550 
 
Beneficiary: Fordyce & Malcolm  Beneficiary: Arbuthnot & Guthrie 
Maturity £  Maturity £ 
07-Jun 300   07-Jun 300  
12-Jun 750   12-Jun 350  
17-Jun 500   12-Jun 400  
  
 17-Jun 300  
  
 17-Jun 200  




Figure 20. Diagram of the Ayr Bank’s liability management. For simplicity, discount interest and commissions are omitted. Note that specie 




Table 17. Ayr Bank systemic position, 22 June 1772. Amounts in thousands of pounds sterling 
 Ayr Bank Scotland Great Britain 
Country bank notes 224 868 26% 2,000 11% 
Deposits 300 1,149 26%   
Private bank capital 104 500 21% 2,500 4% 
Private bank  
long term assets 
825 2,700 31% 12,000 7% 
Bills on London 
(drawn as liabilities) 
600 
(50%) 
 most 3-7,000 9-20% 
Bills on London  
(held as assets) 
409 
(33%) 
 most 3-7,000 6-14% 
 
Sources: Ayr Bank: Table 11 above. Scotland: Checkland 1975, p. 235-7. Great Britain: 
Table 15 above, Capie, ‘Money and economic development in eighteenth-century 
England’, p. 224, Cameron, Banking in the early stages of industrialization,  1967, p. 




Figure 21. Bank of England end of year drawing accounts and bills under discount. Amounts in thousands of pounds sterling. Figures up 
to 1764 are as of end of August, from 1766 onwards as of end of February. 1765 is therefore not represented as the accounting 




Figure 22. Maturity profile for bills and notes discounted by the Bank of England, 1708-1709. Source: BOE C28/6. 
 
